Abstract
I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously been recognized.
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Notes
Jackson (1986: 291). Emphasis in the original.
Jackson (1982: 133). Emphasis in the original.
Cavedon-Taylor (2008: 106). Emphasis in original.
I am indebted to Joe Neisser for forcefully emphasizing this point in discussion.
Jackson (1986: 291).
Jackson (1986: 291).
Cavedon-Taylor (2008: 107).
Jackson (1982: 133). Emphasis in original. This claim of Jackson’s is also cited by Cavedon-Taylor as support for his interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism.
Jackson (1986: 291).
Jackson (1982: 133).
References
Cavedon-Taylor, D. (2008). Still Epiphenominal Qualia: Response to Muller. Philosophia, 37(1), 105–107. doi:10.1007/S11406-008-9152-6.
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 127–136. doi:10.2307/2960077.
Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn’t know. The Journal of Philosophy, 83, 291–295. doi:10.2307/2026143.
Muller, H. (2008). Why qualia are not epiphenomenal. Ratio, 21, 85–90.
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Muller, H. More Troubles for Epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 37, 109–112 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9159-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9159-z