Abstract
Within philosophy there has been little discussion of the risks associated with natural events such as earthquakes. The first objective of this paper is to demonstrate why such risks should be the subject of more sustained philosophical interest. We argue that we cannot simply apply to risks associated with natural events those insights and frameworks for moral evaluation developed in the literature considering ordinary risks, technological risks and the risks posed by anthropogenic climate change. The second objective of this paper is to identify and develop a framework for the moral evaluation of the source of the risks associated with natural events, or the actions which sustain and impact such risks. Our discussion concentrates on the ways the construction and modification of built and natural environments can alter the probability of occurrence of natural events and the character and magnitude of the impact that such events have. We then argue for the need to develop a standard of reasonable care for decisions about the built and modified natural environment, which accounts for technical and resource constraints, as well as the place of natural hazard mitigation in public policy.
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Notes
For a comprehensive overview of the impact of natural disasters in recent decades see Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2006).
United Nations, World Conference on Disaster Reduction (2005), at p. 3.
Natural hazards have not been the subject of extensive philosophical discussion. Discussion of the societal impact of natural hazards can be found in Murphy and Gardoni (2006, 2007, 2008) and Gardoni and Murphy (2009). Rubenstein (2007) also references natural disasters in the course of developing the principles that should be regulating international aid and in particular emergency and development aid.
The definition we provide is more specific than some definitions found in the philosophical literature and reflects the fourth meaning of risk covered by Hansson (2007), where he writes risk is defined as ‘the statistical expectation value of an unwanted event which may or may not occur. The expectation value of a possible negative event is the product of its probability and some measure of its severity.’ In the philosophical literature, risk is broadly understood as a possible scenario in which adverse events take place. See Hansson (2007); Campbell and Curie (2006).
Referring to such risks as those associated with natural events is preferable to natural hazards because, as it will be argued in this paper, the consequences associated with natural events are typically the results of complex interactions between the natural events and the built environment and not merely from the natural hazards per se.
This understanding of the natural environment resonates with the emphasis on the vitality of matter in Bennett (2010).
The built environment is man-made, but is often created by using natural raw materials. For example, a reinforced concrete structure is made using materials including aggregates (fine and coarse gravel), water, and iron, all of which are found in nature. However, the end product does not exist in the natural environment. Alteration of the natural environment refers to things that change the form or state of the natural environment, by transforming it into a new state that is also present in nature. For example, by cutting trees or deforestation you can create plains. By drying wetlands you can create plains. The end-state is still nature, but its characteristics have been altered by man.
Natural events are thus not ‘natural’ in the sense that they are occurrences that are unaffected by our actions. Rather, they are ‘natural’ in the sense that they are the result of complex interactions and processes in the natural environment. This is not to suggest that the probability of occurrence is always under our control. For some natural hazards, such as naturally occurring earthquakes, we have little control over their probability of occurrence.
Technological risks have a certain similarity with the view Joseph Raz takes with respect to law. Law is an institution that makes certain kinds of abuses possible, and the rule of law is a negative virtue which prevents these abuses from being realized. Without the law, in Raz’s view, individuals and communities do not confront a risk of the occurrence of certain kinds of harm.
Issues of responsibility are more complicated in the context of technological hazards, in part because the link between technology and certain harms can be more difficult to establish and responsibility for harmful consequences can be more diffuse. For example, there may be evidence that the chemical a particular factory is emitting has harmful health consequences for the local population, but the evidence may not amount to or pass the standards for scientific proof. This has led to discussions about the standard that should be met for legal liability for harm to obtain, and in particular whether legal action should be permitted when there are science-based reasons to be concerned about the negative impact of a substance on human health without the harmful effect meeting the rigorous standards for scientific proof [or who should be responsible for cleaning up a mess that occurs]. See Haack (2009), Cranor and Nutting (1990), Cranor (1990), Hansson (2004), Lemons et al. (1997) and von Magnus (1984).
For some technological risks, it may be similarly claimed that it is not feasible for individuals to choose to avoid exposure to certain risks, like those stemming from driving, given that driving is so deeply embedded in the structure of life of many communities. This may diminish the extent to which we speak of individuals choosing to assume certain risks in these cases.
For a discussion of potential impacts, see van Aalst (2006) at p. 9.
Within tort law, for a plaintiff to recover damages, the standard of conduct that has been breached must be a standard of conduct toward the plaintiff.
For an overview of standards for engineering see Strand and Golden (1997).
There is a complicated interrelationship between the impact of our actions on the risks associated with natural events and our other goals. Increased exposure to risks from natural events might contribute to our ability to achieve other important goals; one alternative although riskier might be deemed preferable in light of its associated benefits. For example, reclamation of wasteland or flooded land by diverting river streams, building dams, levees, or canals might lead to an increase risk of landslides but also enable us to cultivate the land.
We have argued that central concepts in tort law provide important resources for developing a framework for evaluating the built and modified natural environments. However, there are two important ways in which our use of such concepts departs from the use in tort law. First, our focus is on the ways in which the built and modified natural environments affect the risks posed by natural hazards, where no natural disaster or actual harm has yet occurred. In the tort law, someone must be harmed for tortuous liability to be obtained. Second, our use of the standard of care in relation to the built and modified natural environments has implications for who is responsible for mitigation action when needed. By contrast, in tort law the standard of care is used to determine whether an individual should be held liable and has a duty of repair and is responsible for the full costs of the harms that resulted from his or her wrong (Ripstein 2002).
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Acknowledgments
This research was supported primarily by the Science, Technology, and Society Program of the National Science Foundation Grant (STS 0926025). Opinions and findings presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor.
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Murphy, C., Gardoni, P. Evaluating the Source of the Risks Associated with Natural Events. Res Publica 17, 125–140 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-010-9136-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-010-9136-9