Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Perceiving tropes

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to the first one, perception is representational: it represents the world as being a certain way. According to the second, perception is a genuine relation between the perceiver and a token object. These two views are thought to be incompatible. My aim is to work out the least problematic version of the representational view of perception that preserves the most important considerations in favor of the relational view. According to this version of representationalism, the properties represented in perception are tropes—abstract particulars that are logically incapable of being present in two distinct individuals at the same time. I call this view ‘trope representationalism’.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. It is important to emphasize that this objection fails to apply in the case of some versions of the representational view, including those versions that take perceptual content to be Russellian, gappy, singular, object-involving or singular-when-filled (see, e.g., Soteriou 2000; Tye 2007; Schellenberg 2010). See also Sect. 4.3 below.

  2. It is important that the question is about what properties we perceptually attribute to the perceived scene. This is not necessarily the same question as asking what properties we take ourselves to be perceiving.

  3. An anonymous reviewer for this journal pointed out that the trope representationalist account could deliver the same results even if the perceptual content consisted of both tropes and property-types—it is not needed that all properties represented in our perceptual experiences would be tropes, only that some are. This is true and those who are drawn to such a picture of perceptual content can adjust the account I outline here accordingly. But I will not do so here. As we shall see in Sect. 4.3, an important virtue of the trope representationalist account is that it leads to a very simple conception of perceptual content: the perceptual content is just the sum total of the perceptually attributed tropes. If there were both tropes and property-types in the perceptual content, we would need to be able to have a story about the relation between these two kinds of properties within the perceptual content and this would lead to quite a complicated account of perceptual content. Again, such account would be consistent with the general framework I am proposing here, but in order to preserve the simplicity of perceptual content in my account of trope representationalism, I do not explore this option further here.

  4. Kevin Mulligan, one of the most important proponents of the idea that the properties we perceive are tropes, argues that we should endorse the last version. We can perceive the scarletness of the table without perceiving the table as being scarlet: I may not recognize the scarlet thing as a table, after all (Mulligan et al. 1984, p. 307).

  5. Rodriguez-Pereyra is not aiming to defend the ontology of universals, but he notes that Mulligan’s argument also applies in the case of resemblance nominalism, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s own view.

  6. To put it more precisely, it is veridical in the second scenario and not fully veridical in the first. In the first scenario, there will be tropes such that the experience attributes them to the perceived object and the object in fact has them. Shape, size and color tropes are possible examples. But this experience will not be veridical when it comes to the trope of being the very same particular token object as the one I saw a moment ago.

References

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bach, K. (2007). Searle against the world. How can experiences find their objects? In S. L. Tsohatzidis (Ed.), John Searle’s philosophy of language: force, meaning, and thought (pp. 64–78). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bacon, J. (1995). Universals and property instances. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brewer, B. (2006). Perception and content. European Journal of Philosophy, 14, 165–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brewer, B. (forthcoming). Perception and its objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Byrne, A., & Logue, H. (2008). Either/or. In A. Haddock & F. MacPherson (Eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, K. (1981). The metaphysics of abstract particulars. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 6, 477–488. (Reprinted in: D. H. Mellor and Alex Oliver (Eds.): Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 125–139).

  • Campbell, K. (1990). Abstract particulars. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. J. (2004). The representational character of experience. In B. Leiter (Ed.), The future for philosophy (pp. 153–181). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Chalmers, D. J. (2006). Perception and the fall from Eden. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 49–125). New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Clarke, T. (1965). Seeing surfaces and physical objects. In M. Black (Ed.), Philosophy in America (pp. 98–114). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • Crane, T. (2006). Is there a perceptual relation? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 126–146). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Daly, C. (1997). Tropes. In D. H. Mellor & A. Oliver (Eds.), Properties (pp. 140–159). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1967) Causal relation. Journal of Philosophy, 64, 691–703. (Reprinted in: Donald Davidson 1980, Essays on actions and events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 149–162).

  • Ehring, D. (1997). Causation and persistence: A theory of causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grice, H. P. (1961). The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volume, 35, 121–153.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U. (2004). Trope theory and the metaphysics of appearances. American Philosophical Quarterly, 41, 5–20.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1980). Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58, 239–249.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loar, B. (2003). Transparent experience and the availability of qualia. In Q. Smith & A. Jokic (Eds.), New philosophical perspectives (pp. 77–96). New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Lowe, E. J. (1998). Possibility of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M. G. F. (2002). Particular thoughts and singular thought. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 51, 173–214.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M. G. F. (2004). The limits of self-awareness. Philosophical Studies, 120, 37–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M. G. F. (2006). On being alienated. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 354–410). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M. G. F. (forthcoming). Uncovering appearances. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Mellor, D. H. (1995). The facts of causation. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mulligan, K. (1995). Perception. In B. Smith & D. Smith (Eds.), Husserl. Cambridge companions to philosophy (pp. 168–238). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Mulligan, K. (1999). Perception, particulars and predicates. In D. Fisette (Ed.), Consciousness and intentionality: Models and modalities of attribution (pp. 163–194). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mulligan, K., Smith, B., & Simons, P. (1984). Truth makers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 278–321.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2009). The properties of singular causation. The Monist, 92, 113–135.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (2010). Attention and perceptual content. Analysis, 70, 263–270.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, B. (forthcoming a). Action-oriented perception. European Journal of Philosophy.

  • Nanay, B. (forthcoming b). Do we sense modalities with our sense modalities? Ratio.

  • Nanay, B. (forthcoming c). Perception, action, and what’s in between. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Nanay, B. (forthcoming d). Do we see apples as edible? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

  • Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

  • Pautz, A. (2010). An argument for the intentional view of visual experience. In B. Nanay (Ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pautz, A. (forthcoming). Perceptual consciousness. London: Routledge.

  • Peacocke, C. (1989). Perceptual content. In J. Almong, J. Perry, & H. Wettstein (Eds.), Themes from Kaplan (pp. 297–329). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peacocke, C. (1992). A study of concepts. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robb, D. (1997). The properties of mental causation. Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 178–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schaffer, J. (2001). The individuation of tropes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, 247–257.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schellenberg, S. (2010). Particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience. Philosophical Studies, 149, 19–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2005). The phenomenology of efficacy. Philosophical Topics, 33, 65–84.

    Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2006a). Which properties are represented in perception? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 481–503). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2006b). Subject and object in the contents of visual experience. Philosophical Review, 115, 355–388.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2009). The visual experience of causation. Philosophical Quarterly, 59, 519–540.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2010). Do visual experiences have contents? In B. Nanay (Ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soteriou, M. (2000). The particularlity of visual perception. European Journal of Philosophy, 8, 173–189.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spelke, E. (1990). Principles of object perception. Cognitive Science, 14, 29–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spelke, E. (1994). Initial knowledge: Six suggestions. Cognition, 50, 431–445.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, P. F. (Ed.) (1974). Causation in perception. In Freedom and resentment and other essays (pp. 66–84). London: Methuen.

  • Strawson, P. F. (1979). Perception and its objects. In Perception and identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with His Relies, Ed. G. F. MacDonald (pp. 41–60). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Reprinted in Alva Noë and Evan Thompson (Eds.): Vision and Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002, pp. 91–110. Page numbers refer to the reprinted version).

  • Thompson, B. (2009). Senses for senses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87, 99–117.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (2007). Intentionalism and the problem of no common content. Philosophical Perspectives, 21, 495–541.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williams, D. C. (1953). On the elements of being. Review of Metaphysics, 7(3–18), 171–192.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful for excellent comments by two anonymous referees of this journal as well as Susanna Siegel and especially Kevin Mulligan.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, D413 Grote Kauwenberg 18, Antwerp, 2000, Belgium

    Bence Nanay

  2. Peterhouse, Cambridge University, Cambridge, CB2 1RD, UK

    Bence Nanay

Authors
  1. Bence Nanay
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Bence Nanay.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Nanay, B. Perceiving tropes. Erkenn 77, 1–14 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9282-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9282-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation