Abstract
The Logical Reconstruction of the World (Aufbau) is oneof the major works of Rudolf Carnap in which he attempts to putan end to some of the traditional disputes in epistemologyby using what he calls `construction theory'. According tothis theory, one or more constructional systems can be designedin which all the scientific and pre-scientific objects are logicallymade out of a limited number of basic elements. Carnap introducessome options for the basis of this system and chooses thedomain of the autopsychological, i.e., the domain of privateelementary experiences, among them and tries to construct all theconcepts out of them. This phenomenalistic reduction sometimes isseen as embracing a Cartesian dualism of mind and body or even amentalistic monism. However, in this paper, I shall try to showthat the traditional dualist-monist debates are among those disputesthat the construction theory aims to get rid of. I will show thatCarnap's position on the mind-body problem is really close towhat Davidson later termed as `Anomalous Monism' and that thisis why Carnap fails to complete his logical construction at a crucial step.
Whenever possible, logicalconstructions are to be substituted forinferred entities.
Bertrand Russell
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Nasrin, M. Anomalous Monism in Carnap's Aufbau . Erkenntnis 60, 283–293 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023385.19894.47
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023385.19894.47