Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide a preliminary defence of the use of the concept of dignity in legal and ethical discourse. This will involve the application of three philosophical insights: (1) Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games; (2) his related approach to understanding the meanings of words (sometimes summarised as ‘meaning is use’); and (3) Jeremy Waldron’s layered understanding of property wherein ‘property’ consists in an abstract concept fleshed out in numerous particular conceptions. These three insights will be applied, in the first place, to the concept of ‘dignity’, which is chosen here as a good example of a concept which is both vague and contested in legal and ethical discourse, but which can nevertheless be rendered workable by the application of the aforementioned insights. Later, the analysis will be extended briefly to some other troublesome concepts in order to demonstrate its general application. This paper is concerned primarily with formal, rather than substantive questions about dignity. Matters of content will be touched on only insofar as is necessary to illustrate and illuminate my argument about how we ought to approach (rather than answer) questions about dignity. It should be emphasised that because there is no intention of exploring substantive questions in any depth, the discussion here will not delve into the criticisms of ‘speciesism’ often levelled against the idea of ‘human dignity’. ‘Speciesist’ theories are those that claim that the status, value, or rights of human beings can be regarded as being higher than that of other animals, purely on the basis of their membership of the human species, and without justifying the distinction by pointing to any relevant capacity or characteristic possessed by all and only human beings. For a critical description of speciesism see, e.g., Singer [18] Chapter Three passim; for present purposes, the term ‘dignity’ will be used synonymously with ‘human dignity’, and concerns about speciesism will not be considered.
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Notes
The term ‘healthcare law and ethics’ in this context is used to signify the kind of legal discourse with a significant bioethical content that is variously called ‘medical law and ethics’, ‘bioethics and biolaw’ and so on.
The preamble to the UDHR states that ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’, and Article 1declares that ‘[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.’
For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. (With thanks to my colleague, Elaine Webster, for these examples.)
Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1.
Evans v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 21; see also the Grand Chamber judgment: Evans v United Kingdom 6339/05 [2007] ECHR 265 (10 April 2007).
Gallie [7].
Citing P v S and Cornwall CC (C-13/94) [1996] E.C.R. I-2143 EC and KB v NHS Pensions Agency (C-117/01) [2004] E.C.R. I-541 ECJ.
For example, Ruth Macklin has complained that ‘to invoke the concept of dignity without clarifying its meaning is to use a mere slogan’ ([11] 1420).
[2008] UKHL 25.
Ibid. at paragraph 53 per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry.
Ibid. at paragraph 3 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.
Ibid. at paragraph 17 per Lord Scott of Foscote.
Ibid.
Ibid. at paragraph 18.
Ibid. at paragraph 87, per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury.
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Acknowledgment
I am grateful to my colleague, Elaine Webster, for helpful discussion of dignity in the Human Rights law context.
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Neal, M. Dignity, Law and Language-Games. Int J Semiot Law 25, 107–122 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-011-9230-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-011-9230-0