Abstract
Propositional attitude ascribing sentences seem to give rise to failures of substitution. Is this phenomena best accounted for semantically, by constructing a semantics for propositional attitude ascribing sentences that invalidates the Substitution Principle, or pragmatically? In this paper I argue against semantic accounts of such phenomena. I argue that any semantic theory that respects all our apparent substitution failure intuitions will entail that the noun-phrase position outside the scope of the attitude verb is not open to substitution salva veritate, which is counter-intuitive.
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Nelson, M. Puzzling Pairs. Philosophical Studies 108, 109–119 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015716332044
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015716332044