For the Sake of Argument? Do Deliberative Values Mandate Restriction of Freedom of Speech?

Abstract

Certain ways of expression, for example hate speech, can plausibly be said to retard, distort, or undermine deliberation. This might provide a starting point for an argument to the effect that we, at least sometimes, ought to restrict freedom of speech because deliberative values are at stake. In the present article, that suggestion is analysed and it is established that deliberative values, properly construed, can form the basis of a pro tanto reason for restricting free speech. The analysis takes its cue from some of David O. Brink's work, based on an interpretation of J. S. Mill and his ideas as presented in On Liberty. Brink is sensitive to the obvious pitfalls of such a line of argument, and argues that the concept of “reasonableness” is adequately robust to distinguish between justified and unjustified complaints based on deliberative values. Against this, it is argued that reasonableness is in important aspects an inadequate concept for the purpose at hand, and that we should look closer at some lines of thought offered by Mill as concerns the concept of wellbeing which lies at the heart of his doctrine of liberty in order to distinguish between (at least prima facie) justified and unjustified complaints, based on deliberative values.