Abstract
Özkal-Sanver (Theory Decis 59:193–205, 2005) studies stability and efficiency of partitions of agents in two-sided matching markets in which agents can form partitions by individual moves only, and a matching rule determines the matching in each coalition in a partition. In this study, we present the relationship between stability and efficiency of partitions that is analyzed for several matching rules and under various membership property rights codes, now allowing coalitional moves.
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A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at the Eighth International Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory, 6–8 July 2007, Nashville; and at the Ninth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, 19–22 June 2008, Montreal. We thank to participants for several useful comments. This work is part of the project # 107K560 supported by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK).
A preliminary version of this manuscript was part of the Nizamogullari’s master thesis at Department of Economics, İstanbul Bilgi University.
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Nizamogullari, D., Özkal-Sanver, İ. Coalitional stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems. Theory Decis 71, 395–407 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9204-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9204-9