Skip to main content
Log in

Public Reason, Religious Restraint and Respect

Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In recent years liberals have had much to say about the kinds of reasons that citizens should offer one another when they engage in public political debates about existing or proposed laws. One of the more notable claims that has been made by a number of prominent liberals is that citizens should not rely on religious reasons alone when persuading one another to support or oppose a given law or policy. Unsurprisingly, this claim is rejected by many religious citizens, including those who are also committed to liberalism. In this paper I revisit that debate and ask whether liberal citizens have a moral obligation not to explain their support for existing or proposed laws on the basis of religious reasons alone. I suggest that for most (ordinary) citizens no such obligation exists and that individuals are entitled to explain their support for a specific law and to persuade others of the merits of that law on the basis of religious reasons alone (though there may be sound prudential reasons for not doing so). My argument is grounded in the claim that in most instances advocating laws on the basis of religious reasons alone is consistent with treating citizens with equal respect. However, I acknowledge an exception to that claim is to be found when using religious reasons to justify a law also implies that the state endorses those reasons. For this reason I argue that there is a moral obligation for some (publicly influential) citizens, and especially those who hold public office, to refrain from explaining their support for existing or proposed laws on the basis of religious reasons. I conclude by suggesting that this understanding of the role of religion in public political discourse and the obligations of liberal citizens is a better reflection of our experience of liberal citizenship than that given in some well-known accounts of liberalism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. By justificatory liberalism I mean the school of liberalism that makes the public justification of laws the primary condition of political legitimacy. Well known advocates of justificatory liberalism who have argued in favour of the doctrine of religious restraint include: Audi (1997, 2000), Larmore (1987, 2008), Macedo (1990, 1991), Nagel (1987), Rawls (1996, 1997), Waldron (1987)

  2. See, for example, Nagel (1987) pp218−221, 1987, Rawls (1996), p137 and Waldron 1987

  3. See for example: Eberle (2002), Greenawalt, K. (1992, 1995), Perry (2003), Stout (2004), Weithman (2002), Wolterstorff (1997)

  4. Mill for example wrote that ‘the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them’. See Mill, J. S. 1972, p224

  5. Accepting the importance of allowing citizens to express their support for laws on the basis of different reasons does not imply the convergence account of public justification that Gaus advocates. The argument presented above is meant to be consistent with all justificatory liberal account of legitimacy, including what D’Agostino (and Gaus) refer to as the consensus model of public reason. See D’Agostino 1996, p30

References

  • Audi, R. (2000). Religious Commitment and Secular Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beitz, C. (1990). Political Equality. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • D’Agostino, F. (1996). Free Public Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darwall, S. (1977). Two Kinds of Respect. Ethics, 88(1), 36–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eberle, C. (2002). Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Galston, W. (1991). Liberal Purposes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Gaus, & Vallier. (2009). Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 35(1-2), 51–76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greenawalt, K. (1992). Religious Conviction and Political Choice. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenawalt, K. (1995). Private Consciences and Public Reasons. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gutmann, & Thompson. (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Larmore, C. (1987). Patterns of Moral Complexity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Larmore, C. (2008). The Autonomy of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macedo, S. (1990). The Politics of Justification. Political Theory, 18(2), 280–304.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Macedo, S. (1991). Liberal Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mill, J. S. (1972). In H. B. Acton (Ed.), Considerations on Representative Government. London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, T. (1987) ‘Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.16 no. 3

  • Perry, M. (2003). Under God: Religious Faith and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. (1996). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. (1997). The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. The University of Chicago Law Review, 64(3), 765–807.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stout, J. (2004). Democracy and Tradition. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weithman, P. (2002). Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Waldron, J. (1987) ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’ The Philosophical Quarterly, vol.37, no.147

  • Wolterstorff, N. (1997). In R. Audi (Ed.), Religion in the Public Square. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Richard North.

Additional information

For helpful comments and advice I would like to thank the editors of this special issue, Tom Bailey and Valentina Gentile, as well as Jethro Butler and Federico Zuolo.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

North, R. Public Reason, Religious Restraint and Respect. Philosophia 40, 179–193 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9349-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9349-y

Keywords

Navigation