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  • Reply to Flathman and Strong
  • Andrew Norris (bio)

Dick Flathman helpfully reminds us that there is a “conversational politics” that operates quite differently than either the politics of agonism or the Burkean politics of institutions and judgment. I am not sure, however, whether it is right to say, as Flathman does, that the ideal of such a politics is “less soaring, less demanding” than “the politics of truth.” Instead it seems rather more demanding, if only because such a conversational politics will not stand alone, but will require (a relatively success version of) some other more “practical” form of politics. (Conversation as Flathman envisions it will clearly not produce stable, defensible answers to questions of war and peace, the distribution of labor and property, and so on.) And, for that conversational interaction to be both political and desirable, it must be supported by another form of politics that doesn’t hopelessly compromise its participants. It is easy to imagine conversations of great subtlety and art taking place within a broader context of fascism. But how political will these conversations be capable of being before they either implicitly or explicitly embrace fascism or turn upon the fascist political and economic structure that supports them? Consider in this regard Stanley Cavell, who Flathman and I agree has given us some of the most profound reflections we have on this topic.1 Cavell, in discussing what he terms “the conversation of justice,” emphasizes that that open-ended conversation takes place under the conditions of “good enough justice.”2 The conversation of justice is “made possible by the sharing of just institutions.”3 In the absence of just institutions, the character of the people engaged in conversation would simply not be up to the demands Cavell’s work places upon them. Cavell focuses on Rawls’ Theory of Justice as an exemplary statement of the principles that will characterize such institutions. But the widespread acceptance of these principles alone will hardly guarantee that the institutions we share make possible the “way of life” that is the conversation of justice.4 It is the burden of my essay to argue that we will also need, among other things, a shared commitment to truth. 5

Tracy Strong concludes that “the problem with our polity is not best cast in terms of lies” in part from the fact that, according to a recent poll, “approximately two-thirds do not think that Bush describes the situation in Iraq accurately.” But this was hardly true in the run-up to the war, when Bush was far more widely trusted. And it was then that our ability to trust him was really important. It is easy enough now to see that his claims regarding weapons of mass destruction and the likely course of the war were unreliable. Moreover, as I tried to indicate in my piece, the fact that Bush is making many of us (more) cynical about politics when it is too late for us to prevent this unjust and disastrous war is itself cold comfort indeed. Will a cynical electorate be more likely to make involved and thoughtful decisions about, say, Bush’s successor? Will a cynical electorate be more likely to establish the political communities for which Strong calls?

Strong senses that “underlying” my argument is “a sense that truth will make one free,” and he asks, “But can this be the whole story?” As I am not a religious person, I don’t believe that the Word will heal us and set us free. Nor do I think that a proper respect for truth in politics is the whole story. But it is an important part of that story. Strong doubts this, and suggests that in my comments upon Bush’s and Cheney’s lies in support of the war I avoid “the political question, discussion of the policy per se, and not the justification for it.” This distinction (between the political policy and the apolitical justification for that policy) is one that I don’t think anyone committed to democratic principles (and not just “deliberative democracy”) can long maintain.6 For people who purport to govern themselves, the justification for a policy is every bit as...

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