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Logic and the Classical Theory of Mind

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Abstract

I extract several common assumptions in the Classical Theory of Mind (CTM) – mainly of Locke and Descartes – and work out a partial formalisation of the logic implicit in CTM. I then define the modal (logical) properties and relations of propositions, including the modality of conditional propositions and the validity of argument, according to the principles of CTM: that is, in terms of clear and distinct ideas, and without any reference to either possible worlds, or deducibility in an axiomatic system, or linguistic convention.

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Novak, P. Logic and the Classical Theory of Mind. Journal of Philosophical Logic 27, 389–434 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004218607106

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004218607106

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