Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Conceptual Schemes Revisited: Davidsonian Metaphysical Pluralism

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Metaphysica

Abstract

Davidson’s 1974 argument denying the possibility of incommensurable conceptual schemes is widely interpreted as entailing a denial of metaphysical pluralism. Speakers may group objects differently or have different beliefs about the world, but there is just one world. I argue there is tension arising from three aspects of Davidson’s philosophy: (1) the 1974 argument against conceptual schemes; (2) Davidson’s more recent emphasis on primitive triangulation as a necessary condition for thought and language; and (3) Davidson’s semantic approach to metaphysics, what he calls ‘the method of truth in metaphysics’. After elucidating the tension, I argue the tension can be resolved while preserving at least two major tenets of Davidson’s philosophy: (1) conceptual schemes do not carve an uninterpreted reality into different worlds and (2) truth is objective and non-epistemic. I argue Davidson is implicitly committed to a plurality of worlds.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For examples of this standard interpretation of Davidson, see: Aune (1987); Bomardi (1988); Devitt (1997); Glock (2007); Goldberg (2004); Hacker (1996); Hales (1997); Kirkham (1992); Malpas (1998); Putnam (1987); Wheeler (2000).

  2. Davidson criticizes the view that truth can be elucidated in terms of an account of facts which is theoretically independent of the notion of truth we hope to explain. According to Davidson there is no conception of “facts” to which true sentences could “correspond”, or which true sentences “fit”, that is not circular or trivial. The Slingshot Argument is used to show, using simple logical tools, all true sentences have the same referent and all false sentences have the same referent; hence, the use of individual facts to make specific sentences true or false is logically untenable.

    Davidson’s version of the slingshot relies on two basic assumption: (1) set theoretically equivalent or logically equivalent sentences have the same referent; (2) within a referring expression, co-referring expression can be substituted and preserve the original referent of the whole. The argument is as follows:

    1. 1.

      R

    2. 2.

      x| {x = x.R} = x| {x = x} from (1) by set theoretic equivalence to R

    3. 3.

      x| {x = x.S} = x| {x = x} from (2) by substitution of co-referential expressions

    4. 4.

      S by set theoretical equivalence to (3)

    Consider any two sentences alike in truth value R and S.

    R is logically equivalent to x| {x = x.R} = x| {x = x}

    Here is an example to illustrate the previous equation. Let R be: “It doesn’t rain”. Suppose you have a sold out game, but people who have tickets may not show if it rains. If it does not rain, everyone who has a ticket will show up. So, the set of people who hold a ticket and it does not rain (i.e., x| {x = x.R}) is equal to the set of people attending the game (i.e., x| {x = x}). Notice that if it DOES rain then x| {x = x.R} is an empty set because it says ticket holders and it does not rain. If these conditions are not met, there is nothing in the set. R and S need not have anything to do with x, beyond the logical relation expressed in the formula.

    More generally, the set of things equal to themselves x| {x = x} is the universal class. If R is true then x| {x = x.R} also names the universal class; if R is false then x| {x = x.R} names the null or empty set. So, when R is true the identity statement x| {x = x.R} = x| {x = x} is true and when R is false the identity statement is false.

    S is logically equivalent to x| {x = x.S} = x| {x = x} for the same reasons given in the case of R.

    If S and R have the same truth value, x| {x = x.R} = x| {x = x.S}, by substitution of co-referential terms; they both refer to the universal class if R and S are true, or they both refer to the null class if R and S are false.

    There have been criticisms of the various versions of the Slingshot Argument. The criticisms typically challenge the assumed view of definite descriptions or the notion of logical equivalence. Although my purpose in this paper is only to explain Davidson’s use of the argument, readers interested in criticisms of the argument should see Neale (2001); Searle (1995), especially pp. 221–226; and Barwise and Perry (1981).

  3. There is a parallel here with Heidegger’s discussion of truth’s revealing–concealing structure. See the author’s 2006 for a detailed treatment of the similarities between Heidegger’s and Davidson’s theories of truth. Consider Heidegger’s claim in Being and Time:

    Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness, cannot be. Before Newton’s laws were discovered, they were not ‘true’; neither does it follow that they were false, or even that they would become false if ontically no discoveredness were any longer possible. Just as little does this ‘restriction’ imply that the Being-true of ‘truths’ has in any way been diminished. (Heidegger 1962; 269, [227])

References

  • Aune, Bruce. 1987. Conceptual relativism (volume 1: metaphysics). Nous Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives. Volume 1: 269–288.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barwise, J. and Perry, J. 1981. Semantic innocence and uncompromising situations. Midwest Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Volume 6 1: 387–404.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bomardi, Ron. 1988. Davidson in flatland. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Volume 66: 67–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, Donald. 1967. Truth and Meaning. In Davidson 1984, pp. 92–110.

  • ———. 1969. True to the facts. In Davidson 1984, pp. 37–54.

  • ———. 1974. On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. In Davidson 1984, pp. 183–198.

  • ———. 1977a. Reality without reference. In Davidson 1984, pp. 215–226.

  • ———. 1977b. The method of truth in metaphysics. In Davidson 1984, pp. 199–214.

  • ———. 1982. Rational animals. In Davidson 2001c, pp. 95–106.

  • ———. 1991. Epistemology externalized. Dialectica 45: 191–202. Reprinted in Davidson 2001c, pp. 193–204.

  • ———. 1992. The second person. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17: 255–67. Reprinted in Davidson 2001c, pp. 107–122.

  • ———. 1994. The social aspect of language. In B. McGuinness and G. Oliveri (eds.), The philosophy of Michael Dummett. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994.

  • ———. 1997a. Seeing through language. In J. M. Preston (ed.), Thought and language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

  • ———. 1997b. The emergence of thought. Reprinted in Davidson 2001c, pp. 123–134.

  • ———. 2001a. Externalisms. In P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, and G. Segal (eds.), Interpreting Davidson. Stanford: CSLI, 2001.

  • ———. 2001b. Comments on Karlovy Vary. In P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, and G. Segal (eds.), Interpreting Davidson. Stanford: CSLI, 2001.

  • Devitt, Michael. 1997. Realism and truth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Glock, Hans-Johann. 2007. Relativism, commensurability and translatability. Ratio: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Volume 204: 377–402.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldberg, Nathaniel. 2004. ‘E pluribus unum’: argument against conceptual schemes and empirical content. Southern Journal of Philosophy. Volume 424: 411–438.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hacker, P.M.S. 1996. On Davidson’s idea of a conceptual scheme. Philosophical Quarterly. Volume 46184: 389–407.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hales, Steven D. 1997. A consistent relativism. Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy. Volume 106421: 33–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper.

  • Kirkham, Richard L. 1992. Theories of truth: a critical introduction. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malpas, J.E. 1998. Shanks, King-Farlow, and the refutation of Davidson. Idealistic Studies. Volume 18: 20–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neale, Stephen. 2001. Facing facts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Nulty, Timothy J. 2006. Primitive disclosive alethism: Davidson, Heidegger, and the nature of truth. Germany: Peter Lang.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary. 1987. Truth and convention: on Davidson’s refutation of conceptual relativism. Dialectica. Volume 41: 69–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Searle, John. 1995. The construction of social reality. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wheeler, Samuel C. 2000. Deconstruction as analytic philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, 285 Old Westport Road, North Dartmouth, MA, 02747-2300, USA

    Timothy J. Nulty

Authors
  1. Timothy J. Nulty
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Timothy J. Nulty.

About this article

Cite this article

Nulty, T.J. Conceptual Schemes Revisited: Davidsonian Metaphysical Pluralism. Int Ontology Metaphysics 10, 123–134 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-009-0044-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-009-0044-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation