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The ontology of intentionality II: dependence ontology as prolegomenon to noetic modal semantics

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Abstract

This is the second in a sequence of three essays which axiomatize and apply Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology of parts and wholes as a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal semantics for first-order predicate modal languages. The Ontology of Intentionality I introduced enough of Husserl's dependence-ontology of parts and wholes to formulate his account of order as effected by relating moments of unity, and The Ontology of Intentionality II extends that axiomatic dependence-ontology far enough to enable its semantic application. Formalizing the compatibility [Vereinbarkeit] relation implicated in Husserl's notorious doctrine of impossible meanings, the essay introduces a compatibility restriction on relations to formulate Husserl's distinction between singular [einheitliche] and plural [mehrheitliche] objects, using plural relating moments to define first-order versions of Husserl's notions of relation complexes (i.e. Sachverhalte), abstracta of n-ary relation complexes, categorial relations, abstract eide as unifications of categorial relations, semantic domains as completions of abstract eide, and material regions as semantic domains which are compatibility upper bounds of categorial relations. These concepts will enable the formal dependence-ontological noetic semantics for two-valued, first-order modal languages introduced in the sequel Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality, the third essay in the sequence.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Green Bay, WI, 54311-7001, USA

    Gilbert T. Null

  2. 1903 Lakeside Place, Green Bay, WI, 54302, USA

    Gilbert T. Null

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  1. Gilbert T. Null
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Correspondence to Gilbert T. Null.

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Null, G.T. The ontology of intentionality II: dependence ontology as prolegomenon to noetic modal semantics. Husserl Stud 23, 119–159 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-006-9015-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-006-9015-6

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