Abstract
Gupta"s and Belnap"s Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of meaning. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying on a novel version of the sense–reference distinction.
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Orilia, F. Meaning and Circular Definitions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29, 155–169 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004775802643
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004775802643