Journal of the History of Philosophy

256 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY However that may be, Strauss rightly describes Plato as the friend of Socrates, if Socrates preferred a nobly tragic portrait of himself to a mundane "economic" one (pp. 45, 84). HARRYNEUMANN Scripps College Claremont Graduate School Theophrastus, De lgne: A Post-,4ristotelian View o/ the Nature of Fire. Edited with introduction, translation and commentary by Victor Coutant. (New York: Humanities Press, I971) Theophrastus' De lgne is a short treatise, perhaps, as Coutant suggests, consisting of lecture notes, discussing the properties and effects of fire. Since fire was traditionally considered to be one of the four elements (earth, water, air, fire), De Igne may be considered to be an early chemical treatise. It should be of considerable interest to historians of early chemistry, since fire and combustion played important roles in the development of alchemy and chemistry. The treatise provokes interesting questions in this regard: particularly, what was the influence of De Igne on chemical and alchemical writings of late antiquity and the Middle Ages? The scholarly apparatus of this edition is useful, though perhaps more to the specialist than to a reader coming from allied disciplines. Coutant discusses the various manuscripts of De Igne and their relationship to each other; he notes some of the similarities and differences between Theophrastus' views on fire and those of his mentor, Aristotle. Nowhere, however, does he place Theophrastus" book in a broader historical context, and the reader may be left wondering about the historical significance of this interesting little treatise. MARGARETJ. OSLER Harvey Mudd College Le Dieu d'Anselme et les apparences de la raison. By Jules VuiUemin. (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1971. Pp. 189) The author employs a working familiarity with set theory to sharpen his already careful presentation of Anselm's argumentation. The mathematical expertise allows him to show precisely how Anselm's primary formula "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"--is prone to generate antinomies the moment it is put to work. Gaunilon had already noted this fact, of course, yet his inability to formulate the resulting antinomy with precision permitted Anselm to parry his objections to a stand-off. Vuillemin manages to show how two distinct "levels" of antinomy result, depending on the way one puts the original formula to work. A straightforward employment issues in a simple mathematical impasse, "presuming a closed set constituted by all perfections susceptible of more or less" (134). Gaunilon spotted this, however rudimentary his manner of casting it. Anselm's responses invariably managed a more sophisticated and "transcendent" use of the formula, however, thereby avoiding the thrust of Gaunilon's objections yet often leaving the reader wondering whether a better-versed objector could not respond in kind. Vuillemin is not only well-versed but sympathetic as well. He is clearly impressed with Anselm's virtuosity and in the fecundity of the formula itself as well as in the skill he displays in using it. He respects the properly logical exercise which Anselm intends to present and avoids cavilling over certain features which strike us as semantically naive. Instead he uses the tools of set theory, notably the accepted ordering and partitioning theorems, to hone Ansehn's argument to an even finer edge. What appears at this point is another sort of antinomy, better termed epistemological. This antinomy results the ...