Elsevier

Consciousness and Cognition

Volume 33, May 2015, Pages 286-290
Consciousness and Cognition

Review
What if you went to the police and accused your uncle of abuse? Misunderstandings concerning the benefits of memory distortion: A commentary on Fernández (2015)

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.015Get rights and content

Abstract

In a recent paper, Fernández (2015) argues that memory distortion can have beneficial outcomes. Although we agree with this, we find his reasoning and examples flawed to such degree that they will lead to misunderstandings rather than clarification in the field of memory (distortion). In his paper, Fernández uses the terms belief and memory incorrectly, creating a conceptual blur. Also, Fernández tries to make the case that under certain circumstances, false memories of abuse are beneficial. We argue against this idea as the reasoning behind this claim is based on controversial assumptions such as repression. Although it is true that memory distortions can be beneficial, the examples sketched by Fernández are not in line with recent documentation in this area.

Introduction

In a recent paper, Fernández (2015) claims that under certain circumstances, distorted memories might be beneficial. Although we generally agree with the view that memory distortions can have positive consequences, we argue that the reasoning and examples used in Fernández’s paper are not in line with recent documentation concerning the functions of memory and its illusions. In our view, the incorrect reasoning in his paper might contribute to misunderstandings in the field of memory (distortion), misunderstandings that might affect theory and practice altogether.

In this commentary, we articulate several points of contention concerning Fernández’s (2015) speculations about the positive aspects of memory distortion. Specifically, we will first elaborate on the ambiguous and loose use of concepts (i.e., belief and memory) in his paper. Second, we will explain that his fictional example of fabricated memories of abuse being sometimes beneficial rests on flawed assumptions. Third and finally, we argue that Fernández’s review of the benefits of memory distortion not only overlooked much of the literature in this area but also does not align well with recent evidence in this field.

Section snippets

Belief versus recollection1

In the paper, Fernández (2015) frequently resorts to the concept of belief to explain the positive effects of memory distortion. We applaud the use of this concept in the context of memory. Whereas previous memory research has often focused on instances in which belief and recollection are confounded (Smeets, Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2005), an increasingly large corpus of empirical research reveals that belief and recollection are two distinct concepts (Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni,

Fabricated memories of abuse

Fernández (2015) argues that under certain circumstances, fabricated memories of abuse can be beneficial. We must take umbrage at this remark as well as object strenuously to the reasoning put forward by Fernández. His line of argumentation conflicts with the extant literature on trauma, memory, and false memory. Consider Fernández’ (p. 8) key example, which is a fictitious scenario: “Let us imagine that, early in my childhood, I once witnessed my uncle giving a terrible beating to my mother;

What are the benefits of memory distortion?

The fictitious scenarios sketched by Fernández (2015) do not convincingly demonstrate that memory distortions are beneficial, but we acknowledge that the issue of whether there are benefits to having memory distortions is a legitimate one. The older psychiatric literature provides case descriptions of patients who were misinformed by their therapists about the details of aversive life events they had experienced in such a way that the patients came to remember a less dramatic version of these

Implications and conclusions

The arguments and hypothetical examples used by Fernández (2015) can have some unfortunate practical implications. Fernández states that negative feelings might linger for years after someone has forgotten a traumatic event. If one would take this position seriously, then this could affect settings in which therapists treat children and adults with alleged horrendous experiences. Therapists might come to believe that when children (or adults) have certain “strange” feelings without any

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    This paper has been supported by a grant from the Edmund Hustinx Foundation and by a grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO 415-12-003) to HO.

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