Abstract
Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding promising and the epistemic norms which facilitate the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by expressing belief. I go on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory.
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Owens, D. Testimony and Assertion. Philos Stud 130, 105–129 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3237-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3237-x