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An African Conception of Human Rights? Comments on the Challenges of Relativism

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Abstract

The belief that human rights are culturally relative has been reinforced by recent attempts to develop more plausible conceptions of human rights whose philosophical foundations are closely aligned with culture-specific ideas about human nature and/or dignity. This paper contests specifically the position that a conception of human rights is culturally relative by way of contesting the claim that there is an African case in point. That is, it contests the claim that there is a unique theory of rights. It analyses three examples of what often passes as African conception of human rights arguing that they have little or nothing to do with human rights, are simply inadequate or are not African in the sense at issue in a cultural relativism. Along the way, it distinguishes between two meanings of the term African contending that to the extent that the practice of prizing the ‘community’ higher than any other value is definitive of African, the idea of African human rights remains suspect.

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Notes

  1. For example, theorists have more generally defended an African meaning of democracy (Kwasi Wiredu 1997; Edward Wamala 2006; Joe Teffo 2006) indicating that the meaning of the concept is culturally relative.

  2. I should note that I am not interested in a catalogue raisonné of human rights; my interest is in the question of whether there are diverse, culturally relative (more specifically African) foundations for human rights. Or, alternatively, the question of whether ideas about human nature and/or dignity supposedly unique to African cultures can provide a plausible philosophical foundation for human rights.

  3. For a similar employment of the term African in this latter sense, see Hountondji (1983, 2002),

  4. This is the idea of the individual birthed in the Enlightenment and given full expression in the writings of Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1821), and Immanuel Kant (1785).

  5. As Nhlapo observes, African Relativists about human rights hold that unlike the African one, Western conception of human rights ‘reflects the liberal, individualistic tradition of Western Europe and America and therefore has no relevance for African society’ (Nhlapo 1989, pp. 2, 4).

  6. The question of what the appropriate relationship between individual and community should be has generated lively debates in African philosophy. I have examined elsewhere three ways of characterising this relationship and argued in favour of the approach that takes individual as basic in relation to the collective (see Oyowe 2013a).

  7. Mbiti’s (1969) widely cited maxim ‘I am because we are; since we are therefore I am’ (p. 109) captures this concept of human nature.

  8. During the drafting of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the drafters explicitly appealed to this idea of human nature as part of the commitment to remain faithful to African traditions. According to the rapporteur report, ‘Noting that in Africa, man is part and parcel of the group, some delegations concluded that individual rights could be explained and justified only by the rights of the community’ (OAU Rapporteur Report 1981).

  9. I should note that the question of which set of rights are more fundamental is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the focus is to contest a specifically African conception of human rights (whether social, economic, political, civil or otherwise).

  10. Here, I distinguish between factual and moral equality, where the former relates to considerations of equality based on mundane facts about human beings (e.g. height, intelligence, educational and social background, etc.) and the latter has to do with considerations about how to treat human beings as equals making equality a moral ideal. It is highly unlikely that human beings are factually equal—it is a simple empirical fact that people are unequal in terms of mental and physical strength, intelligence, social background, etc. Identifying human nature with the variations that characterize human life cannot guarantee the moral equality of persons.

  11. To have an intrinsic property is to have a property that is internal to one’s nature. Most, if not all people believe that each human being has properties (or characteristics) that are intrinsic as opposed to extrinsic (i.e. external to the nature of human beings).

  12. Similar distinction can be made between human rights and benefits. Human rights are not the same as benefits, although there are obvious benefits to having such entitlements as human rights to freedom of association, life and not to be tortured. Moreover, there may be benefits where no rights can be claimed. In this sense, not all benefits that human beings enjoy are entitlements. In this connection, acts of charity are often cited. While a beggar may benefit from the generosity of another, it is not obvious that the beggar is entitled in the sense at issue in a human right to that generosity. If the generous person’s action is a strong obligation, it may be explained in terms of a general obligation to do good, which may involve a divine command, rather than a special entitlement owed to the beggar. It may be grounded, for instance, on the duty to advance the collective good of all; in this case, rights as special human entitlements need not be claimed, for what is it to claim that a beggar has a right to the money in each and every person’s wallet? This is also true of one’s kinsmen; if there is a strong obligation to provide for one’s kinsmen, such obligation has its roots in the value placed on kinship relations rather than on special entitlements one’s kinsmen have.

  13. It is worth noting that many commentators on human rights in Africa have found it less attractive to ground claims about human rights and individual freedom on the a conception of self that prioritizes the collective over individuals (see Okolo 2003; Metz 2011).

  14. It is believed that by balancing as it were the claims of individuality and collectivity, this conception of human nature and, by extension, human rights stop short of the excessive individualism that is often the target of attack in supposedly Western conceptions of human rights (Hellsten 2004, p. 68; Howard 1995, p. 1; Cobbah 1987, p. 314).

  15. In addition, if Kaphagawani’s criticism of Mbiti’s claim (on which see above) is correct, then it is the case that Dzobo’s own version is doubly troubled by the charge that it is logically problematic.

  16. Many critics of Gyekye are in agreement, arguing quite compellingly that his conception of human rights is actually indistinguishable from the first conception analysed here, which Gyekye strongly rejects (1997, pp. 38–39). For criticisms of Gyekye’s conception of human rights see Matolino (2009) and Famakinwa (2010).

  17. I wish to indicate briefly how Metz’s African based conception of human rights may be deployed in practice. Because it is based on the individual’s capacity for community, Metz sees a violation of human right as ‘a matter of exhibiting extraordinarily unfriendly behaviour toward’ others. Thus, with regards to socio-economic rights he maintains that it involves the State doing ‘what it can to improve’ the quality of life of its people, ‘fight poverty’, and all such objectives that seeks to promote community well-being (see Metz 2011).

  18. I am grateful to Thad Metz for pushing me on this point.

  19. It seems to me that this is what Alasdair McIntyre (1984, p. 137) and Charles Taylor (1991, p. 33) had in mind when the argued that even in situations of isolation vital familial and friendly connections with others remain.

  20. Indeed, there is a tension noticeable in Metz’s works. For instance, in an earlier work ‘Toward an African Moral Theory’ he seems to hold that community rather than some individual capacity is the most important value in the world (2007, p. 334), something he clearly denies in his discussion of his supposedly African account of human rights (Metz 2011, 2012a).

  21. The terms capacity for autonomy and capacity for deliberative judgment are often used interchangeably as I have done here. In particular, I am guided by Metz’s employment of these terms in characterizing what Kant takes to be constitutive of dignity. Employing these terms this way seem to me uncontroversial since the capacity for autonomy (or self-government) involves agent having the capacity to make deliberative judgments.

  22. I have argued elsewhere that in applying his conception of human rights to various socio-political issues that have generated animated controversies in Africa, including especially land reform, Metz employs a tendentious meaning of human rights (see Oyowe 2013b).

  23. The drafters of the Charter were required to draw on the ‘…the virtues of [African] historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and people’s rights.’ (Article II, OAU Charter, cited in D’Sa 1985, p. 74).

  24. Article 2, African Charter.

  25. For a deeper reflection on the idea that the notion of human rights is but only one way of guaranteeing human dignity, see Donnelly (1982) and Leary (1990). The implication is that if alleged African conceptions of human rights are properly understood as conceptions of duties, they may be defended as alternative and legitimate ways of protecting human dignity rather than as distinct conception of human rights.

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  1. University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg, Kwa-Zulu Natal, South Africa

    Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe

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Correspondence to Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe.

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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of Johannesburg Philosophy seminar series on 21 August 2013 under the title ‘African Conceptions of Human Rights? Between the Demands of Universalism and Relativism’. I am grateful to the participants at the seminar for their very helpful comments and criticisms.

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Oyowe, O.A. An African Conception of Human Rights? Comments on the Challenges of Relativism. Hum Rights Rev 15, 329–347 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-013-0302-2

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