Abstract
In this paper the informativeness account of assertion (Pagin in Assertion. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) is extended to account for inference. I characterize the conclusion of an inference as asserted conditionally on the assertion of the premises. This gives a notion of conditional assertion (distinct from the standard notion related to the affirmation of conditionals). Validity and logical validity of an inference is characterized in terms of the application of method that preserves informativeness, and contrasted with consequence and logical consequence, that is defined in terms of truth preservation. The proposed account is compared with that of Prawitz (Logica yearbook 2008. pp. 175–192. College Publications, London, 2009).
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Pagin, P. Assertion, inference, and consequence. Synthese 187, 869–885 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9906-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9906-8