Abstract
I will consider Armstrong's problems in trying to account for structural universals,i.e., a kind of complex universal whose instantiation by particulars involves differentparts of those particulars instantiating several basic properties and relations, such asthe property of being a molecule of methane. I present and criticise Armstrong's mostrecent attempt to explain structural properties by means of the identification of universals with types of states of affairs and I state my own solution to the problem by appealing to formal relations holding between particulars.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Armstrong, D. M.: 1983, What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Armstrong, D. M.: 1986, ‘In Defense of Structural Universals', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 85–88.
Armstrong, D. M.: 1997, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Campbell, K.: 1990, Abstract Particulars, Blackwell, Oxford.
Lewis, D.: 1986, ‘Against Structural Universals', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62, 25–46.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Pagés, J. Structural Universals And Formal Relations. Synthese 131, 215–221 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015765414172
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015765414172