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Vague Objects Without Ontically Indeterminate Identity

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Abstract

The supporter of vague objects has been long challenged by the following ‘Argument from Identity’: 1) if there are vague objects, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3) there are no vague objects. Some supporters of vague objects have argued that 1) is false. Noonan (Analysis 68: 174–176, 2008) grants that 1) does not hold in general, but claims that ontically indeterminate identity is indeed implied by the assumption that there are vague objects of a certain special kind (i.e. vague objects*). One can therefore formulate a ‘New Argument from Identity’: 1′) if there are vague objects*, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3′) there are no vague objects*. Noonan’s strategy is to argue that premiss 1′) is inescapable, and, as a consequence, that Evans’s alleged defence of 2) is a real challenge for any supporter of vague objects. I object that a supporter of vague objects who grants the validity of Evans’s argument allegedly in favour of 2) should reject premiss 1′). The threat of the New Argument from Identity is thus avoided.

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Notes

  1. Other philosophers argued that Evans’ argument for premiss 2) is to be rejected, while premiss 1) is correct. Among them, it is worth mentioning Parsons and Woodruff (1995), Parsons (2000) and Edgington (2000).

  2. As a matter of fact, Noonan works with a slightly richer set of premisses. But, since a), b) and c) suffice for his conclusion, I limit my attention to them for the sake of simplicity.

  3. As a matter of fact, Noonan works with a slightly richer set of premises also in this case. But, since a), b) and c) suffice for his conclusion, I limit my attention to them.

  4. See Noonan: ‘I do say that ‘everyone knows that’ the Evans argument does not exclude the existence of vague objects (objects with indeterminate boundaries), citing the case of Everest. But I expected the reader to recognize, by the end of the paper, that I intended ‘everyone knows that’ to be understood as the negation operator’ (2008: 176, footnote 3) and ‘I conclude that it is not as easy to accept Evans’s argument and to hold on to ontic indeterminacy as it might at first seem’ (2004: 134).

  5. For an investigation of these restrictions on (Det*) see Heck 1993 and Edgington 1993.

  6. This means that Evans’s argument is not strong enough to demonstrate 2). For this reason I say that Evans’s argument ‘allegedly’ demonstrates 2).

  7. For example, Heck 1998. It is interesting to observe that if someone believes—contrary to Heck’s and my opinion—that determinately and indeterminately ‘generate a modal logic as strong as S5’, she allows Evans’s argument to demonstrate 2) and she deduces d′) from b) and c) with the same rules used in her reconstruction of Evans’s argument.

  8. This observation has been usefully pointed out by Heck 1998.

  9. For example, ΔA → A is an obvious schema in a logical language with Δ. But ▲A → A is not an acceptable schema in logical language with ▲, for it can be determinate whether A when A is false.

  10. If Lewis 1988’s interpretation is accepted, Evans assumes ▲ and its dual to introduce referentially transparent contexts.

  11. Provided (Det**) is subject to the same restrictions as (Det*). For an explanation of the restrictions on (Det**) see Heck 1998.

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Acknowledgments

This work is dedicated to the memory of Paolo Casalegno, who discussed it with me during the last months of his life. I miss his deep philosophical insight and his friendship. I presented this paper at the 2008 SIFA Conference in Bergamo, I thank anyone who attended my presentation and raised questions. I am grateful to Pierdaniele Giaretta, Andrea Bottani, Andrea Bonomi, Patrick Greenough and two anonymous referees for helpful advice on earlier versions of this paper.

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Correspondence to Elisa Paganini.

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Paganini, E. Vague Objects Without Ontically Indeterminate Identity. Erkenn 74, 351–362 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9257-8

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