This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
This is a strict biconditional: necessarily, a subject instantiates x iff she perceptually predicates y.
For more on this theme, see Siegel (2010).
See Sider (2010) for an introduction to λ-abstraction.
Dorr 2010, p. 550.
See Williamson (1999), among many others.
As Robbie Williams observes in a recent draft (ms: 1), ‘classical treatments of indeterminacy are on the march. A growing number of authors argue that we can have an adequate theory of indeterminacy or vagueness that demands no revision of the classicism-presupposing theories used throughout the sciences.’
Likewise for polyadic predicates: for any objects x 1…x n , it is vague whether an n-place predicate F applies to an n-tuple <x 1…x n > iff <x 1…x n > is in the extension of some (but not all) F-candidates.
Dummett 1975, p. 260.
Russell 1923, p. 83.
Lewis 1986, pp. 212–13.
This claim (sometimes expressed as the view that ‘truth = supertruth’) has become increasingly unpopular since McGee and McLaughlin’s classic (1995) paper.
We stress that this assertion is compatible with any sensible theory of vagueness, including epistemicism (Williamson 1994) and other classical-logic-endorsing views.
It is important to stress that content-candidates need not be superdeterminate colours. Content-candidates may also be determinable colours. The crucial point is that each content-candidate C is precise: there is no object x such that it is vague whether x has C. The notion of a ‘precise determinable property’ is perfectly coherent.
Why have we continually reminded the reader that ‘Avril’ is a free variable standing for an arbitrary object? It is widely recognized that the following inference is valid, where α is a free variable standing for an arbitrary object: ‘∀xΔφ(x); therefore, Δφ(α)’. However, it is equally widely recognized that same inference is invalid if α is a vague noun phrase (cf. Lewis 1988; Williamson 2003; Williams 2008). It is important, therefore, to stress that ‘Avril’ is a variable standing for an arbitrary object, not a vague proper name.
For countless discussions, thanks to John Hawthorne and especially Jeremy Goodman.
References
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 18, 227–247.
Braun, D., & Sider, T. (2007). Vague, so untrue. Nous, 41, 133–156.
Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism defended. The Philosophical Review, 110, 199–240.
Dorr, C. (2010). Iterating definiteness. In R. Dietz & S. Moruzzi (Eds.), Cuts and clouds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dummett, M. (1975). Wang’s paradox. Synthese, 30, 301–324.
Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese, 30, 265–300.
Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 31–52.
Hill, C. (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Johnston, M. (2004). The obscure object of hallucination. Philosophical Studies, 120, 113–183.
Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1988). Vague identity: Evans misunderstood. Analysis, 48, 128–130.
Ludwig, K., & Ray, G. (2002). Vagueness and the sorites paradox. Philosophical Perspectives, 16, 419–461.
McGee, V., & McLaughlin, B. (1995). Distinctions without a difference. Southern Journal of Philosophy (Supplement), 33, 203–251.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435–456.
Pautz, A. (2006). Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation. Nous, 40, 205–240.
Pautz, A. (2007). Intentionalism and perceptual presence. Philosophical Perspectives, 21, 495–541.
Pautz, A. (2009). What are the contents of experiences? The Philosophical Quarterly, 59, 483–507.
Perkins, R. (ms) Vagueness and the philosophy of perception. BPhil Dissertation, University of Oxford.
Russell, B. (1923). Vagueness. The Australian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 84–92.
Sider, T. (2010). Logic for philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Siegel, S. (2010). Do visual experiences have content?’. In B. Nanay (Ed.), Perceiving the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color and content. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Williams, J. R. G. (2008). Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity. Philosophical Quarterly, 58, 135–154.
Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness. London: Routledge.
Williamson, T. (1999). On the structure of higher-order vagueness. Mind, 108, 127–143.
Williamson, T. (2003). Vagueness in reality. In M. J. Loux & D. W. Zimmerman (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. (2004). Everything. Philosophical Perspectives, 17, 415–465.
Williams, J. R. G. (ms). Classical indeterminacy.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Perkins, R., Bayne, T. Representationalism and the problem of vagueness. Philos Stud 162, 71–86 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9990-8
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9990-8