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For helpful comments on this paper I thank Jerry Fodor, Arthur Danto, and Akeel Bilgrami.
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Pessin, A. Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places. Philos Stud 78, 33–53 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989817
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989817