Abstract
It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a preference knows that she has the preference in question and is disposed to act upon it. This paper argues the dubiousness of that assumption. An account of indeterminate preferences in terms of self-predicting subjective probabilities is given, and a decision rule for choices involving indeterminate preferences is proposed. Wolfgang Spohn’s and Isaac Levi’s arguments against self-predicting probabilities are also considered, in light of Wlodek Rabinowicz’s recent criticism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Broome J. (1998). ‘Is Incommensurability Vagueness?’. in R. Chang (eds)., in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Harvard University Press, 67–89. Reprinted in Broome’s book Ethics Out of Economics, 123–44.
E. Carlsson (2004) ArticleTitle‘Broome’s Argument Against Value Incomparability’ Utilitas 16 220–224 Occurrence Handle10.1017/S0953820804000548
J. Cantwell (2003) ArticleTitle‘On the Foundations of Pragmatic Arguments’ Journal of Philosophy 100 383–402
Davidson D. (1980): ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible’, in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford University Press.
DeFinetti, B. (1974-5): Theory of Probabilty, 2 vols., Wiley.
DeGroot M. H. (1970): Optimal Statistical Decisons, McGraw-Hill.
P. Gerrans (2002) ArticleTitle‘The Theory of Mind Module in Evolutionary Psychology’ Biology and Philosophy 17 305–321 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1020183525825
Hansson S. O. (2001) : The Structure of Values and Norms, Cambridge University Press.
J. M. Joyce (2002) ArticleTitle‘Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One’s Own Actions’ Philosophical Studies 110 69–102 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1019839429878
Levi, I. (1989): ‘Rationality, Prediction, and Autonomous Choice’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (Suppl), 339–362. Re-printed in Levi, I. (1997): The Covenant of Reason, Cambridge University Press.
Luce R.D. (1959/2005): Individual Choice Behaviour. A Theoretical Analysis, John Wiley and Sons.
W. Rabinowicz (2002) ArticleTitle‘Does Practical Deliberation Crowd Out Self-Prediction’ Erkenntnis 57 91–122 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1020106622032
Ramsey, F. P. (1926): ‘Truth and Probability’, in . Mellor (ed.), Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logics, and Methematics and Economics, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.
L. J. Savage (1954) The Foundations of Statistics EditionNumber2 Wiley and Sons Dover
W. Spohn (1977) ArticleTitle‘Where Luce and Krantz Do Really Generalize Savage’s Decision Model’ Erkenntnis 11 113–134 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00169847
Sugden, R. (2004): ‘Loss Aversion and Prefrence Imprecision’, paper presented at 11th International Conference on the Foundations and Applications of Utility, Risk and Decison Theory.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Peterson, M. Indeterminate Preferences. Philos Stud 130, 297–320 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-4515-8
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-4515-8