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Minimal Consequentialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Peter Caws
Affiliation:
The University of Kent at Canterbury, The George Washington University

Extract

In this paper I propose to set out, and argue for, a theory of what makes acts morally permissible. The claims about morality that I shall be advancing will be minimalist. By this I mean that the scope of the theory will be restricted to as small a class of acts or courses of action as possible, and its bearing on the members of that class to as narrow a range of characteristics as possible. My starting point is that, as Dostoevsky put it, 'everything is permitted'– unless there prove to be good reasons why it cannot be.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1995

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References

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