Abstract
This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this issue from a modern Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are ‘roughly equal’) if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good. The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective.
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Notes
The authors would like to thank Ruth Chang, Roger Crisp and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
The second intuition tallies particularly well with the so called threshold view of the virtues, which we take to be relatively uncontroversial and will not defend here. The notion that there often are several acts that are available to the virtuous agent is in line with the position we take Aristotle to endorse in the NE (e.g. the talk about methodological imprecision in NE.1). Throughout the paper we will use the words ‘fine’, ‘noble’, ‘good’ and ‘permissible’ interchangeably.
It has been pointed out to us that given that the agent is lead by fairness or justice (both of which are prominent virtues) when weighing two options, she would reach a conclusion about what to do. Hence, the problem we describe may not be a genuine one for the virtue theorist. This suggestion, however, seems to contradict the second premise above: If there is a character virtue that can settle the choice, then it seems that the chosen option would indeed be more virtuous than the alternative, and hence choosing one option was actually more virtuous than the other. While it is indeed possible that fairness or justice could settle many difficult choices, this seems to indicate that this was after all not the type of situation we set out to discuss.
E.g. NE1105a31, 1144a19.
NE1139a35-39. This is why rational choices involve not only intellect and thought, but a state of character; for acting well and its contrary require thought and character.
The authors would like to thank Roger Crisp for pointing this out.
In traditional money-pumps rationality forces the agent to make a series of choices that lead to a sure loss. The present money-pump is weaker, in that it is merely permissible to perform a series of choices that lead to a sure loss. There is also a third type of intermediate money-pumps; suppose that plumping requires that you choose each option with some non-zero probability; then, after an infinite number of iterations, it is certain that you will lose all you money, because of the law of large numbers.
This version of the money-pump argument is weaker than the traditional one. We merely show that the agent is permitted to act in a way that leads to a certain loss, which is counterintuitive, not that rationality forces the agent to swap and end up with a certain loss. We will discuss this point in depth in Section 3.
One only has to read e.g. passage/NE1141b10-22/to understand why this has become such a contested aspect of the NE.
See e.g. the Book 3 account of the NE.
See e.g. R Sorabji (1980), ‘Aristotle on the role of intellect in virtue.’ In, Essays On Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A O. Rorty.
See Book 6.9.
For a discussion on why the virtuous life is the good life see e.g. NE Book 1 and the ‘complete life’ in Book 10.
Eudaimonia is the best life for any human, about this we have no choice because it is a result of our nature see e.g. NE1111b28-30.
See Book 7 of the NE.
Nussbaum M (1990), Love’s Knowledge, p 55.
Critics of virtue ethics often complain that since there is no independent criterion for the correctness of moral judgment, it is not clear how the virtuous agent is to be identified. The Aristotelian response to this would presumably be that any satisfactory moral theory must have its roots in a theory of how human beings are by nature constructed (i.e. the Function Argument). To this it can be added that it is possible to recognise when someone is leading a fulfilled life—much in the same way as it does not take trained doctor to see if a person is in good health. Moreover, it could be pointed out that the virtuous person is capable of explaining their actions, albeit in hindsight, and that they will do this by invoking one or several of the virtues is evidence.
See Book 9.2 of the NE, especially the last sentence. For a good general point about why Aristotle thinks that rules are a bad idea in ethics see Book 1.3 and Book 5.10 of the NE,/NE1137b19-24/.
For a discussion see Crisp R., Aristotle on Greatness of Soul, in Kraut R. Blackwell Companion to the Nicomachean Ethics, Blackwell, 2006.
See e.g. Book 1 of the NE.
See e.g. Broome (1991).
Chang (2002) p 674.
See Peterson (2007).
Schick (1986:117).
Rabinowicz (2000). Rabinowicz’ version of the argument is quite complex and requires a technical apparatus that is not appropriate for this paper.
Chang (2005, pp 346–47).
Chang (2005, p 347).
Chang has pointed out to us that when items are on a par, she thinks that we have a special kind of rational freedom to choose either alternative. Hence, when alternatives are on a par with respect to all-things-considered virtue, there is room for us to “carve” our virtuous characters one way rather than another through an act of will. (Personal correspondence, March 2010).
Rabinowicz (2008) and in conversation.
The key claim is that, “When we call one good ‘better’ than another, we mean that the one good is preferable to the other. In other words, it is correct to prefer the one good, for its own sake, to the other”. Brentano (1969 [1889], p. 26).
This was suggested by Rabinowicz to one of the authors in August 2005 (in conversation).
The difference between plumping and parity is that the former concept applies to choices (although different, the two options are equally choice-worthy from a practical point of view), whereas parity is a claim about value, and not about choice.
See e.g. Book 2.6 of the NE.
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