Abstract
Traditional theories of multi-person choice takes as exogenous data the allocation of decision power, that is, they assume the answer to the question of who-decides-what. This paper applies the standard economic theory of scarce resource allocation to explain observed allocations of decision power using as an illustrative example the allocation of power across committees in the U.S. Congress.
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Philipson, T. The exchange and allocation of decision power. Theor Decis 33, 191–206 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133640
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133640