Abstract
Integrity is sometimes conceived in terms of the wholeness of the individual, such that persons who experience temptations or other sorts of inner conflicts, afflictions, or divisions of self would seem to lack integrity to a greater or lesser degree. I contrast this understanding of integrity—which I label psychological integrity—with a different conception which I call practical integrity. On the latter conception, persons can manifest integrity in spite of the various factors mentioned above, so long as they remain true to their commitments in action and deliberation. Although psychological harmony is one feature reasonably associated with integrity, I suggest that practical integrity captures other features of character and action often (and reasonably) related to ascriptions of integrity. Practical integrity remains possible even for those who must confront, manage, and control factors that give rise to various kinds of inner conflict.
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Notes
My general approach is similar to Cox et al (2003), though I am focused here on the relation between integrity and inner conflict, and do not argue, as they do, for the claim that integrity is a “thick virtue term” (and not simply a formal virtue) (41).
Importantly, Cottingham considers whether psychological integrity is sufficient for a good life, and contends that this depends upon whether such integrity requires some orientation to an objective good. If not, then he says integrity is not sufficient. However, he remarks, ‘We could put the point either by saying that mere integrity is not sufficient for the good life, or alternatively by reserving the label ‘true integrity’ for integrated conduct that is directed towards a good and a virtuous way of living. Either way, the upshot, from the point of view of morality, is effectively the same’ (13). Cottingham seems to favor the ‘true integrity’ approach; however, this is a side-point in his main analysis of integrity itself, which focuses upon psychological integration.
Given what I say about Cottingham in Note 2 above, it should be clear that he, too, would be troubled by such a case, and might say either that while such a life has integrity, it is not a good life from the moral point of view, or that it does not manifest ‘true integrity.’
J.P. Day (1993) claims that tempt should be treated as a success term; hence, ‘Strictly…we ought to say that Satan tried (unsuccessfully) to provoke Job to renounce God, and we ought to speak of ‘the Attempted (but failed) Temptation [of Jesus] in the Wilderness’ (176). Day’s discussion is interesting, but it is not clear that tempt and its cognates are used primarily as a success terms (although if the claim were that to tempt someone is at least to successfully get that person to deliberate about accepting the tempting good, then this might seem more plausible).
Putman (2001) discusses alcoholism in articulating his conception of psychological courage, and the applicability of the example to what I am calling practical integrity first occurred to me after encountering Putnam’s illuminating discussion.
Antabuse causes severe nausea when alcohol is consumed while taking it.
Avoidable in the sense that these situations are not mandated by other strong commitments. The harder case is one in which the person believes that, in order to honor some other commitment, she must put herself in situations in which she knows she will have to contend with such cravings. The discussion of divided selves below will suggest what we might say about conflicting commitments from the perspective of practical integrity.
Cottingham discusses this in terms of diachronic, as opposed to synchronic, unity or fragmentation (2010: 5).
Importantly, Gaita suggests that this person’s sense of ineliminable conflict need not be a false perception on his part: ‘His friends sorrow over his pain but cannot wish it otherwise, for it is so constitutive of him, that to wish it otherwise would be to wish him to be someone else’ (162). For similar examples, see Calhoun (1995) and Davion (1991).
For extended discussions of the possibility of maintaining integrity in situations that seem to require compromise, see Benjamin (1990), esp. 61–84.
An extreme case here is that of dissociative identity disorder (what is commonly called multiple personality disorder), and the attempt to ‘integrate’ the dissociated personalities back into a whole person. See, for example, Robert Oxnam’s (2005) account of his own efforts to integrate. Such cases raise innumerable difficulties, since even if we see greater integrity in Oxnam by the end of his narrative, he is still comprised of three personalities, who now exist in a state of mutual awareness and collaboration. To whom would we attribute this greater integrity? All three personalities, working together?
For a related discussion, about whether certain kinds of substantive commitments are necessary for a good life, see Calhoun (2009). (Calhoun argues that a certain form of commitment is not necessary).
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to audiences at the Kentucky Philosophical Association Fall 2010 Meeting and the 2011 Conference on Value Inquiry for their comments and questions on parts of this paper, as well as to Christopher Cowley, Brian Domino, Ron Messerich, Duncan Richter, and an anonymous referee for comments on previous drafts and related papers. Work on this paper was supported by a Junior Faculty Summer Research Award from the College of Arts and Sciences at Eastern Kentucky University during the summer of 2010.
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Pianalto, M. Integrity and Struggle. Philosophia 40, 319–336 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9334-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9334-5