Summary
This paper reconsiders the relation between Kantian transcendental reflection (including transcendental idealism) and 20th century philosophy of science. As has been pointed out by Michael Friedman and others, the notion of a “relativized a priori” played a central role in Rudolf Carnap’s, Hans Reichenbach’s and other logical empiricists’ thought. Thus, even though the logical empiricists dispensed with Kantian synthetic a priori judgments, they did maintain a crucial Kantian doctrine, viz., a distinction between the (transcendental) level of establishing norms for empirical inquiry and the (empirical) level of norm-governed inquiry itself. Even though Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions is often taken to be diametrically opposed to the received view of science inherited from logical empiricism, a version of this basically Kantian distinction is preserved in Kuhn’s thought. In this respect, as Friedman has argued, Kuhn is closer to Carnap’s theory of linguistic frameworks than, say, W.V. Quine’s holistic naturalism. Kuhn, indeed, might be described as a “new Kant” in post-empiricist philosophy of science. This article examines, first, the relativization of the Kantian a priori in Reichenbach’s work, arguing that while Reichenbach (after having given up his original Kantianism) criticized “transcendentalism”, he nevertheless retained, in a reinterpreted form, a Kantian-like transcendental method, claiming that the task of philosophy (of science) is to discover and analyze the presuppositions underlying the applicability of conceptual systems. Then, some reflections on Kuhn’s views on realism are offered, and it is suggested that Kuhn (as well as some other influential contributors to the realism debate, such as Hilary Putnam) can be reinterpreted as a (relativized, naturalized) Kantian transcendental idealist. Given the central importance of Kuhnian themes in contemporary philosophy of science, it is no exaggeration to claim that Kantian transcendental inquiry into the constitutive principles of empirical knowledge, and even transcendental idealism (as the framework for such inquiry), still have a crucial role to play in this field and deserve further scrutiny.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Abela, P.: 2002, Kant’s Empirical Realism, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Andersen, H.: 2001, On Kuhn, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA.
Barker, P., Chen, X. and Andersen, H.: 2003, ‘Kuhn on Concepts and Categorization’, in Nickles (2003), pp. 212–245.
Becker, K.: 2002, ‘Kuhn’s Vindication of Quine andCarnap’, History of Philosophy Quarterly19, 217–235.
Carnap, R.: 1928, Der logische Aufbau der Welt. (English translation: it The Logical Structure of the World & Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, trans. by R.A. George, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1967/1969.)
Carnap, R.: 1950, ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, in L. Linsky (ed.), Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1952/1972, pp. 208–228.
Coffa, J.A.: 1991, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station, Linda Wessels (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Conant, J. and Haugeland, J.: 2000, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, in Kuhn (2000), pp. 1–9.
Davidson, D.: 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
DiSalle, R.: 2002, ‘Reconsidering Kant, Friedman, Logical Positivism, and the Exact Sciences’, Philosophy of Science69, 191–211.
Fleck, L.: 1935, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Eüinfhrung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv, L. Schäfer and T. Schnelle (eds.), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1980.
Foucault, M.: 1966, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Routledge, London & New York, 2000 (English ed. first published in 1970).
Friedman, M.: 1993, ‘Remarks on the History of Science and the History of Philosophy’, in Horwich (1993), pp. 37–54.
Friedman, M.: 1997, ‘Philosophical Naturalism’, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA71(2), 7–21.
Friedman, M.: 1999, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Friedman, M.: 2000a, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Open Court, Chicago & La Salle, IL.
Friedman, M.: 2000b, ‘Transcendental Philosophy and A Priori Knowledge: A Neo-Kantian Perspective’, in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 367–383.
Friedman, M.: 2001, Dynamics of Reason, CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA.
Friedman, M.: 2002, ‘Kant, Kuhn, and the Rationality of Science’, Philosophy of Science69, 171–190.
Friedman, M.: 2003, ‘Kuhn and Logical Empiricism’, in Nickles (2003), pp. 19–44.
Giere, R. and Richardson, A. (eds.): 1996, Origins of Logical Empiricism, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Gupta, C.: 2002, Realism versus Realism, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD.
Gutting, G.: 2003, ‘Thomas Kuhn and French Philosophy of Science’, in Nickles (2003), pp. 45–64.
Hanna, R.: 2001, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Horwich, P. (ed.): 1993, World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA & London.
Hoyningen-Huene, P.: 1993, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science, transl. by A. T. Levine, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London.
Kaila, E.: 1923, ‘Kantia lukiessa’[Reading Kant], Valvoja-Aika1, 190–199.
Kaila, E.: 1926, Die Prinzipien der Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik, Annales Universitatis Fennicae Aboensis B IV:1, Turku.
Kaila, E.: 1979, in R. S. Cohen (ed.), Reality and Experience: Four Philosophical Essays, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Kamlah, A.: 1989, ‘Erläuterungen, Bemerkungen und Verweise zu den Schriften dieses Bandes’, in A. Kamlah and M. Reichenbach (eds.), Hans Reichenbach, Gesammelte Werke 5, Vieweg & Sohn, Braunschweig/Wiesbaden, pp. 371–454.
Kant, I.: 1781/1787, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by N. Kemp Smith, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1965.
Koskinen, H.J.: 2004, From a Metaphilosophical Point of View: A Study of W.V. Quine’s Naturalism, Acta Philosophica Fennica 74, The Philosophical Society of Finland, Helsinki.
Kuhn, T.S.: 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London (1st edition 1962).
Kuhn, T.S.: 2000, in J. Conant and J. Haugeland (eds.), The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970–1993, with an Autobiographical Interview, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London.
Lewis, C.I.: 1923, ‘A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori’, The Journal of Philosophy20, 169–177.
Malpas, J. (ed.): 2003, From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental, Routledge, London & New York.
Manninen, J.: 2002a, ‘Eino Kaila ja tie Wienin piiriin’[Eino Kaila and the Road to the Vienna Circle], Tieteessä tapahtuu2/2002, 34–47.
Manninen, J.: 2002b, ‘Uuden filosofisen liikkeen ja sen manifestin synty’[The Birth of a New Philosophical Movement and Its Manifesto], in I. Niiniluoto and H. J. Koskinen (eds.), Wienin piiri[The Vienna Circle], Gaudeamus, Helsinki, pp. 27–128.
Margolis, J.: 1993, The Flux of History and the Flux of Science, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Margolis, J.: 1995, Historied Thought, Constructed World: A Conceptual Primer for the Turn of the Millennium, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Nickles, T. (ed.): 2003, Thomas Kuhn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Niiniluoto, I.: 1999, Critical Scientific Realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York.
Norris, C.: 2000, Minding the Gap: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science in the Two Traditions, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst.
Oksala, J.: 2002, Freedom in the Philosophy of Michel Foucault, Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki 2, Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki.
Pihlström, S.: 1996, Structuring the World: The Issue of Realism and the Nature of Ontological Problems in Classical and Contemporary Pragmatism, Acta Philosophica Fennica 59, The Philosophical Society of Finland, Helsinki.
Pihlström, S.: 1998, Pragmatism and Philosophical Anthropology: Understanding Our Human Life in a Human World, Peter Lang, New York.
Pihlström, S.: 2003, Naturalizing the Transcendental: A Pragmatic View, Prometheus/Humanity Books, Amherst, NY.
Pihlström, S.: 2004, ‘Recent Reinterpretations of the Transcendental’, Inquiry47, 289–314.
Pihlström, S. and Koskinen, H.J.: 2001, ‘Philosophical and Empirical Knowledge in the Program of Naturalism’, in M. Kiikeri and P. Ylikoski (eds.), Explanatory Connections: Essays Dedicated to Matti Sintonen’s 50th Birthday[online],http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kfil/matti..
Putnam, H.: 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Putnam, H.: 1983, Realism and Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Putnam, H.: 1994, Words and Life, ed. J. Conant, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA & London.
Quine, W.V.: 1951, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in Quine, From a Logical Point of View, revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980 (1st edition 1953), pp.20–53.
Reichenbach, H.: 1916, Der Begriff der Wahrscheinlichkeit fuer die mathematische Darstellung der Wirklichkeit, Inaugural-Dissertation, Universität Erlangen, 1915, in A. Kamlah and M. Reichenbach (eds.), Hans Reichenbach. Gesammelte Werke in 9 Bänden, Vieweg & Sohn, Braunschweig/Wiesbaden, Band 5, 1989, pp. 225–292.(Originally published by Barth, Leipzig. Published also in Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, vol. 161, 210–239; vol. 162, 98–112, 223–253.)
Reichenbach, H.: 1920, The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, trans. by M. Reichenbach, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965. (Originally: Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis Apriori, Springer, Berlin.)
Reichenbach, H.: 1921, ‘The Present State of the Discussion on Relativity’, in M. Reichenbach (ed. & trans.), Modern Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1958, pp. 1–45. (Originally: ‘Der gegenwärtige Stand der Relativitätsdiskussion’’, Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und Kultur10, 316–378.
Reichenbach, H.: 1924, Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre, Vol. 72 of the series Die Wissenschaft, Vieweg, Braunschweig.
Reichenbach, H.: 1925, ‘Metaphysics and Natural Science’, in M. Reichenbach and R.S. Cohen (eds.), Hans Reichenbach, Selected Essays: 1909–1953, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1978. (Originally published in Symposiom 1, 158–176.)
Reichenbach, H.: 1928, Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin & Leipzig.
Reichenbach, H.: 1931, ‘Aims and Methods of Modern Philosophy of Nature’, in M. Reichenbach (ed. & trans.), Modern Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958, pp. 79–108. (Originally published as a booklet under the title Ziele und Wege der heutigen Naturphilosophie, Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1931).
Reichenbach, H.: 1938, Experience and Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Reichenbach, H.: 1951, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, The University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles.
Richardson, A.: 1998, Carnap’s Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Rouse, J.: 2003, ‘Kuhn’s Philosophy of Scientific Practice’, in Nickles (2003), pp. 101–121.
Scheffler, I.: 1967, Science and Subjectivity, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2nd edition, 1982/1985.
Seibt, J.: 2000, ‘Constitution Theory and Metaphysical Neutrality: A Lesson for Ontology?’, The Monist83, 161–183.
Sharrock, W. and Read, R.: 2002, Kuhn: Philosopher of Scientific Revolution, Polity Press, Cambridge.
Siitonen, A.: 1997, ‘The Pragmatic Turn in the Light of Reichenbach’s Experience and Prediction’, in P. Weingartner, G. Schurz, and G. Dorn (eds.), The Role of Pragmatics in Contemporary Philosophy: Papers of the 20th International Wittgenstein Symposium, The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. 2, pp. 903–909.
Siitonen, A.: 2002, ‘Looginen empirismi ja Hans Reichenbachin Experience and Prediction’[Logical Empiricism and Hans Reichenbach’s Experience and Prediction], in I. Niiniluoto and H. J. Koskinen (eds.), Wienin piiri[The Vienna Circle], Gaudeamus, Helsinki, pp. 149–167.
Sokal, A. and Bricmont, J.: 2003, Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern Philosophers’ Abuse of Science, 2nd edition, Profile Books, London (1st edition in French 1997, in English 1998).
Stadler, F.: 1997, Der Wiener Kreis, Springer, Berlin.
Westphal, K.R.: 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1953, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Pihlström, S., Siitonen, A. The Transcendental Method and (Post-)Empiricist Philosophy of Science. J Gen Philos Sci 36, 81–106 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-005-7163-6
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-005-7163-6