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Why Theists Cannot Accept Skeptical Theism

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Abstract

In recent years skeptical theism has gained currency amongst theists as a way to escape the problem of evil by invoking putatively reasonable skepticism concerning our ability to know that instances of apparently gratuitous evil are unredeemed by morally sufficient reasons known to God alone. After explicating skeptical theism through the work of Stephen Wykstra and William Alston, I present a cumulative-case argument designed to show that skeptical theism cannot be accepted by theists insofar as it crucially undermines epistemic license to the very theism it is invoked to defend. I also argue that attempts to defend a theism-friendly moderate version of skeptical theism either fail to halt the spread of damaging skepticism, or lack philosophical validity.

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Notes

  1. It should be noted that the problem of evil can be sidestepped (or at least seriously weakened) if one holds a different conception of God. If one holds, for example, that God is very good (but not perfectly good), and/or very knowledgeable (but not omniscient) and/or very powerful (but not omnipotent), then one can plausibly explain evil as part of God's plan or to some extent out of God's control. This strategy, however, has had limited appeal to theists who hold that God is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.

  2. See Rowe, William, ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,’ in D. Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 1–11. First published in American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), pp. 335–341.

  3. This principle, insofar as it involves weighing goods and evils, suggests the utilitarian calculus. It may be objected, however, that deontological or virtue-ethical conceptions of morality should be taken into consideration here (either exclusively, or in concert with consequentialist considerations). I do not believe that such modifications would affect my argument, but for the purposes of the present paper this possibility will not be explored.

  4. Rowe, ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,’ op. cit., fn 5, pp. 10–11.

  5. See, for example, Wykstra, Stephen, ‘The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of “Appearance,”’ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984), pp.73–93; Wykstra, Stephen, ‘Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments From Evil,’ in D. Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 126–150; Alston, William, ‘Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil,’ in D. Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 311–332, and Howard-Snyder, D., Bergmann, M., and Rowe, W., ‘An Exchange on the Problem of Evil,’ in W. Rowe (ed.), God and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001), pp. 124–158.

  6. It could be claimed that ST need not be committed to the claim that evils might be necessary for the actualization of higher unknown goods. It could be held that God’s permission of those associated (but not necessarily associated) evils might be justified in the absence of this necessary connection. The key idea here is that it is God’s permission of the evil, rather than the evil itself, that is necessary for the actualization of a higher good. Furthermore, it could be held that God’s permission of an evil state of affairs could be justified even if the outweighing higher good is never actualized. This alternative understanding of ST can be given substance through construing the good in question as freely chosen goodness: God wills the actualization of freedom because it is necessary for the actualization of the great good of freely chosen goodness, and God permits the evils that accompany misuses of freedom because of the higher value of freely chosen goodness – a value which cannot exist without God’s permission of the evils accompanying the misuse of that freedom. The specific evils that (can) take place are not necessary for the actualization of freely chosen goodness, but the permission of their possibility is. Moreover, given the great value of freely chosen goodness, God is justified in permitting evils that attend the misuse of freedom, even in cases where freely chosen goodness is never actualized. Although this example is cast in terms of a good that is within our ken, it is possible to suppose that there are other such goods beyond our ken that may support a version of ST. Yet although this is a coherent alternative to the standard accounts of ST, I do not support it, primarily because it seems to run afoul of a necessary condition for a valid morally sufficient reason which would justify God in permitting suffering, viz., that the sufferer of the (possible) evil in question must be compensated for suffering that evil. In accepting this alternative account, one holds that God accepts the suffering of persons for the sake of a good which not only may not be actualized, but which, when not actualized, results in uncompensated suffering. That the suffering in question would be uncompensated is entailed by the claim that the suffering is justified by the possibility of a higher good – the compensating good – which may not be actualized. This possible result seems to seriously impugn God’s goodness. Much more could be said on this account, but for now I will lay the issue to one side. I am indebted to an anonymous referee from Sophia for bringing these considerations to my attention.

  7. Howard-Snyder, D., Bergmann, M., and Rowe, W., ‘An Exchange on the Problem of Evil,’ in W. Rowe (ed.), God and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001), pp. 124–158.

  8. See footnote 5 for the Wykstra references.

  9. Alston, William, ‘The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,’ in D. Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 97–125.

  10. Wykstra, ‘Rowe's Noseeum Arguments from Evil,’ op. cit., p. 126.

  11. Ibid., p. 139.

  12. Ibid.

  13. See Alston, ‘The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,’ op. cit., p. 120.

  14. Ibid., p. 119.

  15. See Russell, Bruce, ‘The Persistent Problem of Evil,’ Faith and Philosophy 6:2 (1989), pp. 121–139; also Russell, Bruce, ‘Defenseless,’ in D. Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 193–205.

  16. See Wykstra, ‘Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil,’ op. cit., and Alston, ‘The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,’ op. cit., and ‘Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil,’ op. cit.

  17. Here I am using a distinction first introduced by William Rowe. For his most recent use of this distinction, see Rowe, ‘Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil,’ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59:2 (2006), pp. 79–92, esp. pp. 83–4. I am indebted to two referees from Sophia for stressing the need for this clarification.

  18. See Wesley Morriston, ‘The Evidential Argument from Goodness,’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. XLII (2004), pp. 87–101.

  19. Richard Gale has written of a related practical problem for the theist which fits in well with my point that skeptical theism makes knowledge of God's moral will difficult. ‘The major problem faced by the moral-inscrutability-of-God version of defensive skepticism is that it seems to preclude our being able to enter into [loving] relationships with God, thereby undercutting the very purpose for which God created us according to theism, namely to enter into a communal relation of love with God.’ See Gale, Richard, ‘Some Difficulties in Theistic Treatments of Evil,’ in D. Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 209–211.

  20. Alston, ‘The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,’ op. cit., p. 120.

  21. Alston, ‘Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil,’ op. cit., p. 318.

  22. Richard Gale, for example, has made this case. See Gale, ‘Some Difficulties in Theistic Treatments of Evil,’ in D. Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 209–211.

  23. Alston, ‘The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,’ op. cit., p. 121. (Italics added.)

  24. Alston, ‘Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil,’ op. cit., p. 321.

  25. I am indebted on this point to an anonymous referee from Sophia.

  26. Bergmann, Michael and Rea, Michael, ‘In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83:2 (June 2005), p. 244.

  27. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines a ‘just so story’ as ‘An explanation of an admittedly speculative nature, tailored to give the results that need explaining, but currently lacking any independent rationale.’ Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Simon Blackburn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 204.

  28. Bergman and Rea, ‘In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy,’ op. cit., p. 244.

  29. This may not be the best story to use, insofar as the reasons behind God’s allowance of Job’s suffering seem to be given in the beginning of the Book of Job, and seem quite accessible to human understanding, but the general point is clear enough: humans lack the power to comprehend both God and God’s reasons for allowing misfortune to beset the faithful.

  30. Letter of Paul to the Romans 8:28.

  31. First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians 1:20–21.

  32. Letter to the Hebrews 11:1.

  33. Almeida, Michael and Oppy, Graham, ‘Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81:4 (December 2003), p. 508.

  34. It could be charged that, insofar as religious experience refers to (putative) divine revelation, an argument based on religious experience is essentially an argument based on faith. The difference, however, can be seen in this: whereas a pure faith-based defense of moderate ST is grounded in ‘the conviction of things not seen,’ a defense of moderate ST based on religious experience is grounded in a conviction formed on the basis of things that have been (putatively) directly experienced. The latter is, thus, at its core, a variant of an argument based on perception (similar to that which one might make to justify belief in the desk at which one works, or the trees outside one’s window), rather than an argument based on a pure leap of faith.

  35. Bergmann and Rea, ‘In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy,’ op. cit., p. 242.

  36. I would like to thank Matthew Piper, Aaron Cobb, Timothy Pawl, and three anonymous referees from Sophia for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

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Piper, M. Why Theists Cannot Accept Skeptical Theism. SOPHIA 47, 129–148 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-008-0053-8

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