Abstract
This paper responds to Ernest Sosa’s recent criticism of Richard Fumerton’s acquaintance theory. Sosa argues that Fumerton’s account of non-inferential justification falls prey to the problem of the speckled hen. I argue that Sosa’s criticisms are both illuminating and interesting but that Fumerton’s theory can escape the problem of the speckled hen. More generally, the paper shows that an internalist account of non-inferential justification can survive the powerful objections of the Sellarsian dilemma and the problem of the speckled hen.
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Poston, T. Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen. Philos Stud 132, 331–346 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2221-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2221-9