Skip to main content

Epistemology, Ontology and the Continuum

  • Chapter
The Growth of Mathematical Knowledge

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 289))

Abstract

Standard wisdom has it that mathematical progress has eclipsed Kant’s view of mathematics on three fronts: intuition, infinity and the continuum. Not surprisingly, these very areas define Brouwer’s own relation to Kant, for Brouwer attempted to recreate the Kantian picture of the continuum by updating Kant’s notions of infinity and intuition in a set theoretic context. I will show that when we look carefully at how Brouwer does this, we will find a certain internal tension (a “disequilibrium”) between his epistemology of intuition and the ontology of infinite objects that he must adopt. However, I will also show that when we search the corresponding Kantian notions for that same disequilibrium, then — despite first impressions — we will find equilibrium instead. Because of this, I will suggest at the end that the basic components of Kant’s eighteenth century view provide a foundation for important parts of classical rather than intuitionistic mathematics. This, in turn, will lead to a reassessment of Brouwer’s Kantianism, and the way that mathematics has progressed from Kant’s time.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 189.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Bottazzini, U. (1986). The Higher Calculus: A History of Real and Complex Analysis from Euler to Weierstrass.Stuttgart: Springer-Verlag.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer, L. E. J. (1907). Over de Grondslagen der Wiskunde. Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, translated and reprinted in Brouwer (1975, 11–101).

    Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer, L. E. J. (1912). “Intuitionism and Formalism.” Bulletin of the.American Mathematical.Society. Volume 20: 81–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer, L. E. J. (1919). Begründung der Mengenlehre unabhägig vom logischen Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten. Zweiter Teil, Theorie der Punkmengen. Amsterdam: Verh. Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam. Pages 3–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer, L. E. J. (1927). “Über Definitionsbereiche von Funktionen.” Mathematische Annalen. Volume 97: 60–7 5.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer, L. E. J. (1948a). “Essentieel Negatieve Eigenschappen.” Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Proc. Volume 51. Translated and reprinted in Brouwer (1975, 478–9).

    Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer, L. E. J. (1948b). “Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics.” Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy. Amsterdam. Pages 1235–49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer, L. E. J. (1952). “Historical Background, Principles and Methods of Intuitionism.” South African Journal ofScience. Volume 49: 139–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brouwer, L. E. J. (1975). Collected Works. A. Heyting. (Ed.). Volume I. Amsterdam: North Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cellucci, Carlo. (1999). “The Growth of Mathematical Knowledge: An Open World View.” this volume.

    Google Scholar 

  • Euler, L. (1755). “Remarques sur les Mémoires Précédens de M. Bernoulli.” in Euler (1952, 233–54).

    Google Scholar 

  • Euler, L. (1952). Opera Omnia. Series 2. Volume 10.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, Michael. (1977). Elements ofIntuitionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, Michael. (1978a). Truth and Other Enigm’s. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, Michael. (1978b). “The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic.” in Dummett (1978a).

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, Michael. (1992). Kant and the Exact Sciences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gardner, Martin (1991). The Unexpected Hanging and Other Mathematical Diversions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gödel, Kurt. (1940a). The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis with the Axioms of Set Theory. Annals of Mathematics Studies. Volume 3. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gödel, Kurt. (1940b). Lecture on the Consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis. Brown University. Reprinted in Gödel (1995, 175–85).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gödel, Kurt. (1951). “Some Basic Theorems on the Foundations of Mathematics and Their Implications.” Josiah Willard Gibbs Lecture, delivered at a meeting of the American Mathematical Society on December 26, 1951. Reprinted in Gödel (1995, 290–323).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gödel, Kurt. (1995). Collected Works. Volume III: Unpublished Essays and Lectures. S. Fefferman et. al. (Eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel. (1781/87). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by N. K. Smith. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel (1992). Lectures on Logic. J. M. Young. (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D. and Montague, R. (1960). “A Paradox Regained.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Volume 1: 79–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leibniz, G. W. (1686). Discourse on Metaphysics. Translated and reprinted in Loemker (1956).

    Google Scholar 

  • Loemker, L. E. (Ed.). (1956). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters. Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posy, Carl. J. (1984). “Kant’s Mathematical Realism.” The Monist. Volume 67: 115–34. Reprinted in Posy (1992).

    Google Scholar 

  • Posy, Carl J. (1991). “Kant and Conceptual Semantics,” Topoi. Volume 10: 67–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Posy, Carl J. (Ed.). (1992). Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics: Modern Essays. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Posy, Carl J. (1995). “Unity, Identity, Infinity: Leibnizian Themes in Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics.” Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress. Marquette University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand. (1897). An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand (1903). The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Troelstra, A. S. (1977). Choice Sequences: A Chapter of Intuitionistic Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yushkevich, A. P. (1976). “The Concept of Function up to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century.” Archive for the History of the Exact Sciences. Volume 16: 37–85.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Posy, C.J. (2000). Epistemology, Ontology and the Continuum. In: Grosholz, E., Breger, H. (eds) The Growth of Mathematical Knowledge. Synthese Library, vol 289. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9558-2_14

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9558-2_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5391-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9558-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics