Skip to main content
Log in

Justification in context

  • Published:
Acta Analytica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Contextualism has been a prominent epistemological theory for more than twenty years. Its central claim is that standards for justification and of knowledge ascriptions can vary from one context to another context. However this in not the end of the story, for one must subsequently explain these variations of standards in order to avoid arbitrariness. Two strategies offer themselves at this point: generalism and particularism. We argue that the latter could provide a viable support for an overall contextualist approach. David Lewis in his paper “Elusive Knowledge” provides a nice case of contextual epistemology and points to several important aspects of knowledge. But we disagree with Lewis on two points of his account: (i) knowledge without justification and (ii) set of exceptionless rules that determine relevant alternatives. We preserve the overall conception of knowledge as justified true belief and attempt to work out a contextualist account of knowledge by pointing to an alternative, particularistic view of relevance and relevant alternatives.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Cohen, S. 1998: “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier and the Lottery”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76, 289–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, S. 1999: “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons”, Philosophical Perspectives 13, 57–89.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dancy, J. 1993: Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dancy, J. 2000: “The Particularist’s Progress”, in B.W. Hooker and M. Little (eds.), Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 130–156.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dancy, J. 2004: Ethics Without Principles. (Oxford: OUP)

    Google Scholar 

  • Gettier, E. L. 1963: “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23, 121–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T. and Henderson, D. 2000: “Iceberg Epistemology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, 497–535.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T. and Henderson, D. 2001: “Practicing Safe Epistemology”, Philosophical Studies 102, 227–258.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T. and Henderson, D. Forthcoming: “Morphological Content and Justified Belief”.

  • Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. 1996: Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Cambridge: MIT.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D. 1979: “Scorekeeping in a Language Game”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8, 339–359.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. 1996: “Elusive Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 549–567.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Potrč, M. and Strahovnik, V. 2004a: Practical Contexts. Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Potrč, M. and Strahovnik, V. 2004b: “Metaphysics: Ultimate and Regional Ontology” Informacion Filosofica, I, 1, 21–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E. 2003: “Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included”, Philosophical Studies 112, 35–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Timmons, M. 1999: Morality without Foundations, New York: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Potrč, M., Strahovnik, V. Justification in context. Acta Anal 20, 91–104 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-005-1024-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-005-1024-0

Keywords

Navigation