Abstract
It is a common claim that one concept of time, tenseless theory, is in greater conflict with how the world seems to us (with the phenomenology) than the competing theories of tense theory and presentism. This paper offers at least one counter-example to that claim. Here, it is argued that tenseless theory fares better than its competitors in capturing the phenomenology in particular cases of perception. These cases are where the visual phenomenology is of events occurring together which must be occurring at different times. The commitments of matching such phenomenology in one’s ontology undermine tense theory and presentism and support tenseless theory.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
In personal correspondence, Tim Bayne has suggested to me that presentism, tense theory, tenseless theory, etc. are better thought of as positions on time rather than concepts of time. What is the difference between 'concept' and 'position'? One difference might be this: these assertions about time do not merely concern thinking about time (concepts) but also commitments as to how time really is (positions). To acknowledge this, I will sometimes refer to them as ‘theories’ and sometimes as ‘positions’.
In visual perception, when the events are stages in something's motion (as they are here), we get what some might call motion blur. However, one should be careful about the use of ‘blur’. 'Blur' could be taken to mean something which is indistinct or unclear.
Phenomenologically at least, with ‘Waves’, the rope's occupancy of ‘A’ and ‘B’ is not indistinct or unclear. The rope seems very clearly to be at both of those locations (which is why, along with the point in footnote 3, this example is chosen for this paper).
In the case of the rope, it might be claimed that it is the 'same thing' that is happening at these different locations and times, e.g., the rope is moving. However, some theorists might claim that what happens at these places and times are different things, e.g., different events happening to the same thing (the rope) or indeed even to different things (e.g., temporal parts of the rope). It is sufficient for this paper that something happens at these different times and places. So, to avoid complication, I keep the more general description. (For discussion on events happening to the same thing, and on temporal parts, see Mellor (op.cit.) and Sider (2003)).
There are lots of other examples of seeing things in space which are at more than one time, some far more extreme in temporal terms. For example, what we see of distant stars happens at dramatically different times to each other and ourselves (for discussion with respect to temporal debates, see Power 2013). Allegedly, early examples of televisions involve cathode ray tubes lighting up the screen at different places at different times. If so, and if we see the whole screen lit up, then we are seeing illuminations happening at different times (e.g., Le Poidevin’s 2004 version of ‘The Experience and Perception of Time’ (not in later versions).
Again, I prefer the example of 'Waves' because, in comparison with other examples, it extends over a greater range of possible worlds consistent with the phenomenology. In a possible world consistent with the phenomenology and
-
a.
the speed of light is infinite (as many medieval scholars thought),
-
b.
the illuminated screen is due to left-over heat on the screen,
things perceived in the distance and on television would be at one time. Yet, 'Waves’ would still be an example of perceiving things at more than one time.
What we see is a single moving thing, only at those places at different times, only reflecting light at those places at different times. The difference is neither due to the time-lag of light nor anything to do with ‘heat traces’ at places where it once was. For, once it is no longer there, there is nothing there at one location (except invisible air) when the rope is at another location.
-
a.
An alternative kind of presentism, compound presentism, is discussed by Dainton 2000. However, it does not seem to be defended by any avowed presentists, so I will not consider it here.
Or the rope seems to have no tense at all. But 'no tense at all' is a particularly problematic position for tense theorists to take. It is the position taken by the tenseless theorists discussed in Sect. 4.
According to tenseless theorists, this is trivially present, as already discussed.
Although I will not discuss it here, I think that '(e)', in particular, is not even something that can be made sense of as a description of perception.
References
Callender C (2008) The common now. Philosophical 18:339–361
Craig WL (1998) McTaggart’s paradox and the problem of temporary intrinsics. Analysis 58(2):122–127
Dainton B (2000) Stream of consciousness: unity and continuity in conscious experience. Routledge, London
Le Poidevin R (2004) The experience and perception of time. In: Zalta EN (Ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/time-experience/. Cited 15th Oct 2013
Le Poidevin R (2007) Images of time. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Loizou A (1986) The reality of time. Gower, Aldershot
McTaggart JME (1908) The unreality of time. Mind New Ser 17(68):457–474
Mellor DH (1998) Real time II. Routledge, London
Power SE (2012) The metaphysics of ‘the specious present’. Erkenntnis 77(1):121–132
Power SE (2013) Perceiving external things and the time-lag argument. Euro J Philos 21(1):94–117
Prior AN (1959) Thank goodness that’s over. Philosophy 34(128):12–17
Schlesinger GN (1991) E Pur Si Muove. Philos Q 41(165):427–441
Sider T (2003) Four-dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time. Oxford University Press, London
Tallant J (2008) What is it to “B” a relation? Synthese 162(1):117–132
Wittmann M (2011) Moments in time. Front Integr Neurosci. doi:10.3389/fnint.2011.00066
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to anonymous reviewers who provided extensive suggestions and advice. Many of the thoughts here come from discussions with colleagues in Philosophy at University College Cork; in particular, my thanks to Julia Jansen, Lilian O’Brien and Joel Walmsley. And also from discussions with members of the TIMELY interdisciplinary research group; in particular, Valtteri Arstila, Bruno Mulder and Marc Wittmann. I am also grateful for general discussions with Robin Le Poidevin and Grace Weir. Lastly, a version of this paper was presented at a 2014 Trinity College Dublin Philosophy Colloquium, and I appreciate the very thought-provoking questions from attendees.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Power, S.E. Perceiving Multiple Locations in Time: A Phenomenological Defence of Tenseless Theory. Topoi 34, 249–255 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9253-8
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9253-8