Journal of the History of Philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 505 The evidence Regan introduces on behalf of these assertions is exiguous. In the welter of words the Bloomsberries wrote about themselves and their philosophies of life, Regan cannot seem to find a direct quote demonstrating that it was this argument that they found in Moore. Indeed, much of the evidence he cites has a contrary import: Virginia Woolf has read Principia ten times and complains she cannot understand it. Another of Regan's theses is that the Bloomsbury construal of Moore is the correct one. But a careful reading of Chapter 5 shows that Moore argues that the answer to the question, "What kinds of actions ought we to perform?" is that we ought always to follow the dictates of common morality. "In short," he writes on page 162 of P.E., "though we may be sure that there are cases where the rule should be broken, we can never know which those cases are, and ought, therefore, never to break it." There are other problems with the book. The subtitle states that Regan will describe the development of Moore's moral philosophy. But he does not; the focus is almost entirely on the Principia. Only a few paragraphs are devoted to Moore's Ethics (but not to its content); yet many philosophers regard it as Moore's greatest contribution to moral theory. Again, though not relevant to his theme, Regan discusses at length the relationship between Moore and Wittgenstein. He more or less accepts the conventional view that Wittgenstein did not think much of Moore as a philosopher and the Moore had virtually no influence on Wittgenstein. But in holding this opinion he overlooks, indeed never mentions, Wittgenstein's last work, On Certainty, which is a running commentary on four of Moore's greatest papers. The entries in On Certainty are dated sequentially, so that we can follow Wittgenstein's growing respect for Moore's defense of "The Common Sense View of the World." One of them (674), dated five days before Wittgenstein died, says: "There are, however, certain types of cases in which I rightly say I cannot be making a mistake, and Moore has given a few examples of such cases." Yet, despite these flaws and others---such as its confusing, non-linear chronological structure--the book has important strengths. One of these is its depiction of Moore's intellectual development including, of course, his growth as a moral philosopher. The portrait of the man Moore that Regan gives us is not only unique in the growing body of Edwardian literature, but it is well done, indeed. AVRUM STROLL University of California, San Diego Walter Watson. The Architectonics of Meaning. Foundations of the New Pluralism. Albany : State University of New York Press, 1985. Pp. xiv + 2o5. Paper $14.95. Historians of philosophy believe that beyond its intrinsic interest, understanding past philosophers ("on their own terms") is an important part of any present philosophizing worthy of the name. Yet, pressed to justify these beliefs, it seems insufficient (though true, certainly) to argue that knowing history helps us avoid repeating past errors in the present; and, since the past philosophies we study may differ radically, our historical interests may seem to commit us to historicism or relativism. In any case, the notorious failure of philosophers to agree has been a scandal from the Hellenistic age 506 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:3 JULY 1988 to the present. Thus Walter Watson's The Architectonics of Meaning is to be welcomed; for it presents an interpretive schema, called 'archic analysis', in which different and apparently conflicting philosophies can be univocally characterized such that apparent disagreements may be seen as consequences of, metaphorically, speaking different languages, rather than saying different things. It is thus, at once, an interpretation of and a contribution to the history of philosophy. The book's premiss, which Watson describes as "the most significant philosophic discovery of the present century" is "the fact of pluralism, that the truth admits of more than one valid formulation" (ix). The doctrine or vision encountered in a philosophy , novel, poem, work of visual art, or religious text (for all are subject to archic analysis and included among...