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An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism

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  1. University of Stirling, FK9 4LA, Stirling, Scotland, UK

    Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup

  2. University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland, UK

    Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup

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  1. Duncan Pritchard
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  2. Jesper Kallestrup
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Pritchard, D., Kallestrup, J. An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism. Philosophia 31, 345–354 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02385190

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02385190

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