Abstract
Any plausible position in the ethics of war and political violence in general will include the requirement of protection of civilians (non-combatants, common citizens) against lethal violence. This requirement is particularly prominent, and particularly strong, in just war theory. Some adherents of the theory see civilian immunity as absolute, not to be overridden in any circumstances whatsoever. Others allow that it may be overridden, but only in extremis. The latter position has been advanced by Michael Walzer under the heading of “supreme emergency.” In this paper, I look into some of the issues of interpretation and application of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” view and some of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. I argue that Walzer’s view is vague and unacceptable as it stands, but that the alternatives proposed by critics such as Brian Orend, C.A.J. Coady, and Stephen Nathanson are also unattractive. I go on to construct a position that is structurally similar to Walzer’s, but more specific and much less permissive, which I term the “moral disaster” view. According to this view, deliberate killing of civilians is almost absolutely wrong.
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Notes
When reprinting the essay in a recent book, Walzer inserted a bracketed remark on this. His amended view is that non-state terrorism might be justified in a supreme emergency, but only in the face of threat of genocide. As a matter of fact, though, “this kind of a threat has not been present in any of the recent cases of terrorist activity. Terrorism has not been a means of avoiding disaster but of reaching for political success” (Walzer 2004b: 54).
Elsewhere I have argued that the bombing campaign cannot be morally justified by a supreme emergency nor, indeed, any other argument—that it was an utterly indefensible and unmitigated atrocity that deeply compromised the just cause for which the Allies were fighting (see Primoratz 2010).
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Primoratz, I. Civilian Immunity, Supreme Emergency, and Moral Disaster. J Ethics 15, 371–386 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-010-9077-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-010-9077-8