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Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck

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Abstract

I outline Greco’s response to the Pyrrhonian challenge to epistemic externalist theories of knowledge and offer two points of criticism. I also argue, however, that there is an account of epistemic luck available which can cast some light on the dispute that Greco is concerned with, and which could, in principle at least, be regarded as being in the spirit of the proposal that Greco sets out.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Striling, FK9 4LA, Stirling, UK

    Duncan Pritchard

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  1. Duncan Pritchard
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Correspondence to Duncan Pritchard.

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Pritchard, D. Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck. Philos Stud 130, 35–45 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3232-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3232-2

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