Journal of the History of Philosophy

Outline of a Reinterpretation of Francis Bacon's Philosophy MAXWELL PRIMACK Tn~ INTF~T OF THIS PAPER is to correct two widespread mistakes that have been made concerning the philosophy of Francis Bacon: (1) the view that Bacon was not concerned with metaphysical issues, (2) the view that Bacon is to be understood primarily as a precursor of the mechanism of Descartes, Hobbes, and Boyle. Henceforth in this paper the first of these views shall be referred to as "the pragmatic interpretation," and the second shall be referred to as the "mechanistic interpretation." The pragmatic interpretation is advanced in its most radical form by Benjamin Farrington in Francis Bacon: Philosopher o] Industrial Science. According to Farrington, the heart of Bacon's thought is his conception of the possibility of revolutionizing technology, and thereby the material condition of human life, by applying science to industry. 1 Farrington regards the frequent characterizations of Bacon as primarily the advocate of an innovation in inductive method to be the product of the overly theoretical concerns of professional philosophers, who, intent on determining Bacon's relevance to their own interests, failed to realize the importance of his own practical interests. 2 According to Farrington, these interests were primary. They were responsible for Bacon's concern with problems of method. For Bacon came to realize that if his program of applying science to industry were to be carried out, there must also be a revolution in method. However, Farrington insists, Bacon's original vision of the possibilities for human control of nature had no basis in his methodological conceptions, let alone any metaphysical conceptions, a Thus Farrington locates Bacon's new inductive method as well as his doctrine of the forms of simple natures, topics which bulk large in Bacon's works, on the periphery of his thought3 1Benjamin Farrington, Francis Bacon: Philosopher o] Industrial Science (New York: 1949), pp. 44f. 2Ibid., pp. l14f. and 171-178. James G. Crowther, in Francis Bacon: The First Statesman o] Science (London: 1960), adopts an interpretation and emphasis similar to Farrington's. 8Farrington's explanation of the origins of Bacon's "new outlook" is in terms of "the voyages of discovery," "the increased tempo of invention in Western Europe" in Bacon's day, and "the religious temper of the age" (p. 144). See also pp. 3-19, 76. Other statements of the pragmatic interpretation are to be found in histories of philosophy where Bacon is frequently treated as nothing more than a propagandist for the new science. See the discussions of Bacon in George Henry Lewes, The History o] Philosophy ]rom Thales to Comte (London: 1870), vol. II; Frank Thilly, A History o] Philosophy (New York: 1925); William T. Jones, History o] Western Philosophy (New York: 1950); Sterling F. Lamprecht, Our Philosophical Traditions (New York: 1955); Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Great Philosophers (New York: 1964). Other commentators, while differing from Farrington concerning the importance for Bacon of his new inductive method, agree with him concerning Bacon's repudiation of any metaphysical concerns: Thomas Forsyth, English Philosophy: A Study o] Its Method and General Development (London: 1910); James Seth, English Philosophers and Schools o] Philosophy [123] 124 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Advocates of the mechanistic interpretation maintain that Bacon had an interest in metaphysical questions, but that his view on these questions are to be understood primarily as anticipatory of the mechanism of Descartes, Hobbes, and Boyle, and were suggested to him in large part by the ancient atomists. All features of the Baconian conception of nature that are inconsistent with the later mechanism of Descartes, Hobbes, and Boyle are to be explained as due to the novelty of the new ideas and Bacon's lack of acquaintance with mathematics and the actual work being done in the sciences of his day. Meyrick H. Carre's comment in Phases of Thought in England is typical: Bacon's ignorance of mathematics and his failure to appreciate the activity of contemporary philosophers held him back from a fuller vision of the new world of thought. And he constantly reverts to qualitative theories of being. Much of the animism of his age is retained in his account of physical and chemical processes. He speaks of...