Skip to main content

CAUSAL EXPLANATION AND MANIPULATION

  • Chapter
RETHINKING EXPLANATION

Part of the book series: BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE ((BSPS,volume 252))

Abstract

Causal explanation proceeds by citing the causes of the explanandum. Any model of causal explanation requires a specification of the relation between cause and effect in virtue of which citing the cause explains the effect. In particular, it requires a specification of what it is for the explanandum to be causally dependent on the explanans and what types of things (broadly understood) the explanans are.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Kluve, J. (2004). On the Role of Counterfactuals in Inferring Causal Effects. Foundations of Science 9: 65–101.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lange, M. (2000). Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Psillos, S. (2002). Causation and Explanation. Chesham: Acumen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, H. A. and Rescher, N. (1966). Cause and Counterfactual. Philosophy of Science 33: 323–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woodward, J. (1997). Explanation, Invariance and Intervention. Philosophy of Science 64 (Proceedings): 26–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woodward, J. (2000). Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51: 197–254.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woodward, J. (2002). What is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account. Philosophy of Science 69: 366–377.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woodward, J. (2003a). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodward, J. (2003b). Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation. http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/archive/00000839/.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2007 Springer

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

PSILLOS, S. (2007). CAUSAL EXPLANATION AND MANIPULATION. In: PERSSON, J., YLIKOSKI, P. (eds) RETHINKING EXPLANATION. BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, vol 252. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5581-2_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics