Abstract
It has recently been argued that origin essentialism regarding individual organisms entails that natural selection does not explain why individual organisms have the traits that they do. This paper defends this and related theses against Mohan Matthen’s recent objections.
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Pust, J. Natural selection and the traits of individual organisms. Biol Philos 19, 765–779 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-0888-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-0888-0