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Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between “is” and “ought”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Katinka J. P. Quintelier  and
Daniel M. T. Fessler
Katinka J. P. Quintelier
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, and Research Unit, “The Moral Brain”, Ghent University, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium. katinka.quintelier@ugent.behttp://users.ugent.be/~kquintel
Daniel M. T. Fessler
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, and Center for Behavior, Evolution, & Culture, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553. dfessler@anthro.ucla.eduhttp://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/fessler
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Abstract

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between “is” and “ought.” Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 266
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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