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Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism

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Abstract

Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future.

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Notes

  1. This is different for meta-ethical relativism: meta-ethical relativism is most often presented or defended in its extreme form, namely that all moral statements are relatively right or wrong if meta-ethical relativism is correct. For a discussion of this view, see Sinnott-Armstrong 2009.

  2. Ethical diversity is here the same as moral diversity. All moral disagreement is an instance of moral diversity but not all moral diversity is an instance of moral disagreement.

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Acknowledgments

K.Q. is grateful for the financial support of the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-Vlaanderen. Without implying that they would agree with our perspectives, we thank UCLA’s XBA group, and Stephen Stich, whose ideas helped shape our thoughts on these matters.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences and Research Unit ‘The Moral Brain’, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000, Ghent, Belgium

    Katinka J. P. Quintelier

  2. Department of Anthropology and Center for Behavior, Evolution & Culture, University of California, Los Angeles, 375 Portola Plaza, 341 Haines Hall, Los Angeles, CA, 90095-1553, USA

    Katinka J. P. Quintelier & Daniel M. T. Fessler

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  1. Katinka J. P. Quintelier
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Correspondence to Katinka J. P. Quintelier.

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Quintelier, K.J.P., Fessler, D.M.T. Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism. Biol Philos 27, 95–113 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-011-9270-6

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