Abstract
What makes an ``ought'' claim authoritative? What makes aparticular norm genuinely reason-giving for an agent? This paper arguesthat normative authority can best be accounted for in terms of thejustification of norms. The main obstacle to such a theory, however, isa regress problem. The worry is that every attempt to offer ajustification for an ``ought'' claim must appeal to another ``ought''claim, ad infinitum. The paper argues that vicious regress canbe avoided in practical reasoning in the same way coherentists avoid theproblem in epistemology. Norms are justified by their coherence withother norms.
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Radzik, L. A Coherentist Theory of Normative Authority. The Journal of Ethics 6, 21–42 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015887107235
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015887107235