Abstract
Eudaimonistic theorists of welfare have recently attacked conative accounts of welfare. Such accounts, it is claimed, are unable to classify states normally associated with physical and emotional health as non-instrumentally good and states associated with physical and psychological damage as non-instrumentally bad. However, leading eudaimonistic theories such as the self-fulfillment theory and developmentalism have problems of their own. Furthermore, conative theorists can respond to this challenge by dispositionalizing their theories, i.e., by saying that it is not merely the realization of one’s values that is non-instrumentally good for one, but that the disposition to realize one’s values is also non-instrumentally good for one. This approach, properly elaborated, can accommodate the idea that, in many cases, states normally associated with physical and psychological health (or unhealth) are non-instrumentally good (or bad). It also preserves the many well-known advantages of conative theories.
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Notes
Ben Bradley argues that conative theories that answer the objections based on false pleasures count certain desires (e.g., the desire to have one’s life go badly) as paradoxical that are not transparently paradoxical (Bradley 2009). Here, it is assumed that this cost is worth paying to avoid the objections based on false pleasures.
This paper argues that certain states normally associated with physical and emotional health (or its lack) have a non-instrumental bearing on welfare. However, it is not part of this paper to provide any particular theory about the nature of physical or emotional health. Several theories of health have been proposed, each of which would have different implications for the exact relation between health and well-being. For example, some philosophers take health to involve functioning that supports happiness (Whitbeck 1981; Pörn 1984; Nordenfelt 1995; Richman 2004). Others argue that health consists in statistically normal functioning (Boorse 1977). Some argue instead that health involves functioning that conduces to organismic survival (Lennox 1995). Finally, some argue that health involves rationally valued or desired forms of functioning (Caplan 1994). It is worth noting that, if some of these theories are true, then the theory ultimately defended here will neither imply that all healthy states are non-instrumentally beneficial, nor that all unhealthy states are instrumentally harmful.
Special cases involving Body Integrity Identity Disorder are discussed below (see fn. 19).
Robert Adams discusses some similar cases—and the limitations of various forms of desire-satisfaction in handling them (Adams 1999, pp. 89–91).
This conclusion fits well with and derives support from the thought that there are states of the human person that are directly beneficial, even when they are not desired. Haybron mentions many such states, including confidence, self-esteem, optimism, having an expansive mood or spirit, having a sense of personal freedom, and feeling emotionally engaged with one’s life (Haybron 2008). It might, of course, be argued that these, too, are merely instrumentally good or overall good for a person. However, arguments parallel to the ones provided above also cast doubt on these claims.
It should be noted that this conception does not entail that the self is permanently fixed, or even that there is one and only one way that a given person might achieve self-fulfillment. Rather, this theory is compatible with the idea that the self evolves, where its course of evolution “depending heavily on social and cultural factors as well as our particular values” (Haybron 2008, p. 184).
Similar things might be said about the fulfillment of one’s physical nature: a person who is naturally sickly and for whom exercise and physical activity are quite difficult might fulfill their physical nature by languishing in bed and avoiding strenuous physical activity.
In particular, Kraut seems to be on better ground than the desire-satisfactionist when it comes to explaining the harms associated with aging: “If we go on long enough, we will endure physical enfeeblement, loss of memory, and the constriction of social and intellectual skills. The desires of an old person who has declined in this way might be rational, properly informed, and fully satisfied; nonetheless, the quality of his life has diminished, and to explain why we make this judgment we must appeal to a concrete conception of the powers we take it to be good for a person to exercise (and therefore bad to lose)” (2007, pp. 138–139).
Consider this passage: “[A]lthough we can describe human beings as having destructive powers – they certainly can, in most circumstances, develop the ability to harm others – it does not follow that it is non-instrumentally good to develop, exercise, and enjoy them … [T]hat part of what is natural to us – if it is natural – should, unlike other parts, be extirpated because it does us no good” (Kraut 2007, pp. 190–191).
Kraut himself criticizes Ross on similar grounds: “It is unilluminating to be told that … knowledge, virtue, and pleasure are good for us. Any theoretician who makes such a claim will be asked, why?” (2007, p. 202).
Kraut (2007, p. 202).
It may be objected that, since identification is a conscious process – a form of satisfaction with one’s desires, a disposition not to further question or scrutinize them – this approach makes no room for non-conscious values (for discussion of these, see Schultheiss and Pang 2007). But the view defended below is compatible with the idea that such motives are real parts of an individual’s personality. It is furthermore compatible with the idea that such motives are important for well-being: insofar as significant disparities exist between one’s conscious and non-conscious motives, one will be disposed to inefficacious action and various forms of negative affect. It is true, though, that this approach reserves the term “values” for consciously held valuations.
It is hardly trivial what degree of awareness is involved, here. If a young boy were excited to sign up to play youth football, but left the very first practice crying and exclaiming, “I didn’t know that it would be like that!”, then we would say that the boy merely thought he valued football. However, if a woman knew a man for many years, lived with him, had a serious romantic relationship with him, and later discovered to her great dismay that he was habitually unfaithful to her, I think we would say that she did care about him and value him, despite her ignorance.
The theory can be extended to evaluate welfare over periods of time and the welfare-values of lives, but space constraints prohibit discussion of these extensions, here.
This should not be taken to imply that everyone has a prudential reason to be controlling in the familiar sense. Self-regulation, here, simply means guiding one’s actions by reference to one’s values. It is possible to value spontaneity or novelty or extemporaneous fun, and being guided by these values might involve loosening control and letting things happen.
This is merely a convenient name: this approach to well-being does not commit one to any particular view of agency.
Tiberius (2008) highlights the importance of various traits and attitudes that are constitutive of reflective wisdom and important elements in living a life that survives one’s own reflective appraisal. These include: flexibility (controlling one’s level of absorption in various thoughts and tasks, knowing when to engage in reflection and when not to), perspective (the ability to relate others’ experiences of their values to one’s own, and to bring one’s thoughts and actions into line with these reflections), self-awareness (openness to information about oneself available from others or only accessible from an external point of view, as well as the capacity for constructive self-criticism), and optimism (dedication to the proposition that ideals are realizable, and the attitude that others are worthy of association, attention, and interest).
Various activities that undermine physical health can also be instrumentally good in some contexts. Smoking, drug-use, and compulsive eating, for example, are causally linked with states that this theory classifies as directly harmful, and so are classified by the theory as instrumentally bad. However, these activities might simultaneously be instrumentally good, if they are part of a routine that enables a person to pursue or achieve other values. It is therefore possible that such activities be prudentially rational for an individual, provided that the net welfare-gain presented by them outweighs their net welfare-cost.
A case that is in some respects similar concerns individuals with the disorder that is now called “body integrity identity disorder” (BIID) (Phillips et al. 2010). Such individuals characteristically desire to amputate one or more of their own limbs. Some in the medical community now believe that amputation is actually an effective treatment for some individuals with BIID. Unlike those who suffer from body dismorphic disorder (BDD)—which covers eating disorders and addiction to plastic surgery—sufferers from BIID frequently report that they are much happier after becoming amputees (Elliott 2003). It is now thought that BIID has a neurological basis; it involves “a mismatch between the cortical representations of the body and the objective body,” causing subjects to experience their own limbs as alien appendages or foreign objects (Levy 2007). While amputation is intrinsically harmful, insofar as the destruction of a healthy limb would undermine a person’s ability to causally influence the world, it could simultaneously be instrumentally good, if it reduces anxiety in a way that simultaneously promotes improved functioning. Amputation might even in some cases be overall good for the individual in question—it simply depends on whether they would more closely resemble the paradigm of the flourishing agent with the limb in question or without it.
It will be noted that, on this theory of well-being, ecstasy and elation are not necessarily good for one: the emotional disposition that prepares one for action is simply good cheer; the only other forms of positive affect that are directly good for one are the enjoyments that constitute one’s valuings (the enjoyments with which one identifies) and the positive emotional feedback that one experiences upon successfully pursuing, achieving, or maintaining a value. The resulting theory, also illuminates why it is a good thing that the glow of an achievement eventually fades.
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to Jennifer Hawkins, Chris Heathwood, Kristen Hine, Kris McDaniel, and an anonymous referee for this journal for detailed feedback on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Erik Angner, Michael Bishop, Teresa Chandler, Daniel Doviak, Timothy Freeze, Toby Handfield, Dan Haybron, Marcy Lascano, Christopher Rice, Alex Sarch, Clifford Sosis, Frans Svensson, and Valerie Tiberius for helpful discussion of the ideas contained herein.
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Raibley, J. Health and well-being. Philos Stud 165, 469–489 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9951-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9951-2