Abstract
In this paper we investigate three approaches to iterated contraction, namely: the Moderate (or Priority) contraction, the Natural (or Conservative) contraction, and the Lexicographic contraction. We characterise these three contraction functions using certain, arguably plausible, properties of an iterated contraction function. While we provide the characterisation of the first two contraction operations using rationality postulates of the standard variety for iterated contraction, we found doing the same for the Lexicographic contraction more challenging. We provide its characterisation using a variation of Epistemic ranking function instead.
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Ramachandran, R., Nayak, A.C. & Orgun, M.A. Three Approaches to Iterated Belief Contraction. J Philos Logic 41, 115–142 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9201-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9201-7