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Must a metaphysical relativist be a truth relativist?

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. De Anza College, 95014, Cupertino, CA, USA

    Steven Rappaport

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  1. Steven Rappaport
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I wish to thank Professor Ernest LePore for helpful comments on a version of this paper which was presented at the 1990 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association.

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Rappaport, S. Must a metaphysical relativist be a truth relativist?. Philosophia 22, 75–85 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379808

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