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From a necessary being to god

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Abstract

Not a lot of work on theistic arguments has been devoted to drawing connections between a necessary being and theistic properties. In this paper, I identify novel paths from a necessary being to certain theistic properties: volition, infinite power, infinite knowledge, and infinite goodness. The steps in those paths are an outline for future work on what William Rowe (The Cosmological Argument, 1975, p. 6) has called “stage II” of the cosmological argument.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN, 46556, USA

    Joshua Rasmussen

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  1. Joshua Rasmussen
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Correspondence to Joshua Rasmussen.

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Rasmussen, J. From a necessary being to god. Int J Philos Relig 66, 1–13 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-008-9191-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-008-9191-8

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