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Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, And The Unity Of Science ((LEUS,volume 1))

Abstract

Greg Restall challenges the relevantist to explain the Dog's reasoning in pursuing the Man down the right fork, having only verified that the Man did not take the left fork. I do so, showing thereby not only what the relevantist must mean by validity, but why Restall's pluralism is an incoherent and untenable position.

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References

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© 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

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Read, S. (2009). In Defence Of The Dog: Response To Restall. In: Rahman, S., Symons, J., Gabbay, D.M., Bendegem, J.P.v. (eds) Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Logic, Epistemology, And The Unity Of Science, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2808-3_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2808-3_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-2486-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-2808-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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