Abstract
Almost every contemporary theory of knowledge is a version of fallibilism, yet an adequate statement of fallibilism has not yet been provided. Standard definitions cannot account for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. I consider and reject several attempts to resolve this difficulty before arguing that a belief is an instance of fallibilistic knowledge when it could have failed to be knowledge. This is a fully general account of fallibilism that applies to knowledge of necessary truths. Moreover, it reveals, not only the connection between fallibility and error, but the connection between fallibility and accidental truth as well.
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Reed, B. How to Think about Fallibilism. Philosophical Studies 107, 143–157 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014759313260
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014759313260